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A

LTHOUGH many of the real property cases reported during the survey period provide little more than a review of basic property law,
significant developments occurred in the areas of title insurance, contracts,
brokerage, and mortgages. This Article follows the basic format established by the last seven Survey articles on real property.' Topics such as
homestead and community property, oil and gas, and ad valorem taxation,
which are covered in other articles in the Survey, are omitted from this
Article. Also in keeping with the previously established format, no discussion of cases concerning condemnation or eminent domain is included.
I.

A.

TITLE PROBLEMS

Ownership and Boundary Disputes

1. Adverse Possession. As in previous survey years, acquisition of title by
adverse possession 2 continued to be one of the most litigated real property
issues. The majority of these cases focused on whether the adverse claim1. Raines, RealProperty,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 43 (1980); Bentley,
Heath, Martin & Katz, Real Property,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 31 (1979);
Heath & Bentley, Real Property,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 27 (1978); Heath

& Bentley, RealProperty,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 27 (1977); Wallenstein &
St. Claire, Property,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 28 (1976); Wallenstein, Prop-

erty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 29 (1975); Wallenstein, Property,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 27 (1974).
2. Adverse possession is defined in TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5515 (Vernon
1958) as "an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under
a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another."
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ant introduced sufficient evidence to establish that his possession was hostile to the extent necessary to place the true owner on notice that his
3
property was being adversely possessed for the necessary period of time.
In Radord v. Garza4 the adverse claimant was the grantee under a deed
from the tenant of the record owner.5 The only evidence of an adverse and
hostile claim to the property related to the recording of a deed from the
tenant of the record owner to the claimant and the subsequent rental of the
property by the claimant to other tenants.6 Evidence was introduced that
the record owner rarely visited the property and that he was not aware that
the property was being occupied by such other tenants until eight years
prior to the filing of the suit. The court noted that when an adverse claimant's right arises from a landlord-tenant relationship, possession by a tenant will not be adverse unless there is a repudiation of the landlord-tenant
relationship and an assertion of a hostile claim. 7 Furthermore, the court
stated that notice of the repudiation and assertion of the hostile claim must
be given to the landlord. 8 In this instance the court held that the mere
recording of the deed from the tenant to the claimant did not in itself constitute sufficient adversity to put the record owner on notice. 9 The court
further added that the change in tenants did not constitute constructive
notice of a repudiation of the landlord-tenant relationship.' 0
3. Texas has six limitations statutes that vest title to real estate by adverse possession.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5507, 5509-10, 5519a (Vernon 1958), 5518-19 (Vernon
Supp. 1980-1981). Depending on various factors and circumstances, the limitations period
can be as short as three years and as long as twenty-five years. Id. See general, Larson,
Limitations on Actions for Real Property.- The Texas Five-Year Statute, 18 Sw. L.J. 385
(1964); Larson, Texas Limitations.- The Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15 Sw. L.J. 177 (1961);
Raines, supra note 1, at 45 n.8; Note, Adverse Possession.- The Three, Five and Ten Year
Statutes of Limitation, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 78 (1975).
4. 586 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
5. Id. at 658-59. The claimant defended the plaintiff's trespass to try title action by
asserting ownership of the land in dispute by adverse possession under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. arts. 5507, 5509-10 (Vernon 1958). 586 S.W.2d at 658. The appellate court addressed
the claims asserted under arts. 5509 and 5510. Id. at 660-61.
6. The court noted that under the 10-year limitation statute, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958), a claimant must demonstrate: "1) possession of the land; 2)
cultivation, use or enjoyment thereof; 3) an adverse or hostile claim; 4) an inclusive dominion over the property and appropriation of it for his own use and benefit; 5) for the statutory
period." 586 S.W.2d at 660.
7. 586 S.W.2d at 661. There is a presumption in Texas that a tenant's use of rental
property is permissive and in recognition of a landlord's title. Tex-Wis Co. v. Johnson, 534
S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex. 1976). In fact, Texas courts have recognized that any other rule
would make it hazardous for an owner to enter into a landlord-tenant relationship. See, e.g.,
Udell v. Peak, 70 Tex. 547, 551, 7 S.W. 786, 788 (1888).
8. 586 S.W.2d at 661. Notice may be actual or constructive. Id. Constructive notice
of repudiation of the landlord-tenant relationship must be visible, continuous, and openly
notorious. Killough v. Hinds, 161 Tex. 178, 183, 338 S.W.2d 707, 711 (1960) (citing Evans v.
Templeton, 69 Tex. 375, 378, 6 S.W. 843, 844 (1887)). Such notice may be inferred when
there is a change in the use or character of possession, or when a tenant's continuous possession under a claim of ownership is coupled with a landlord's failure to assert title. Tex-Wis
Co. v. Johnson, 534 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex. 1976).
9. 586 S.W.2d at 662-63.
10. Id. at 662. The repudiation must be so notorious that it is not susceptible of any
explanation consistent with the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship. Todd v.
Bruner, 365 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1963).
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In Runnels v. Whioeld' the court applied the rule presented by the
Texas Supreme Court in Osborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp. ,12 and reaffirmed
in McDonnold v. Weinacht, 3 that the occasional grazing of livestock and
cultivation of crops on incidentally enclosed land is insufficient to establish
title by adverse possession.' 4 Rather, the land must be designedly closed
by the claimant's fences to establish the assertion of a hostile claim.' 5 The
"designedly fenced" rule, however, was not determinative in the holding in
Pendley v. Fie.16 The claimant in Pendley was a grantee under a deed that
purported to vest legal title in him. Although he had maintained a fence
enclosing the claimed property that had been erected by a prior tenant, he
had, in addition, grazed livestock on the property and had paid taxes on
the property for six years. The court, in affirming a judgment for the
claimant,1 7 distinguished McDonnold and Osborn, reasoning that in the
presence of the foregoing open and visible acts on the part of the claimant,
which were sufficient to establish a claim of right to the tract in question
and communicate such intention to the record owner for the statutorily
required period, the designedly fenced rule should not defeat a claimant's
adverse title.' 8
2. Boundary Disputes. In Norris v. Plemons '9 the litigants both claimed
title to a roadway that ran along the common boundary between their
lands. The plaintiff brought a suit in trespass to try title, relying on a survey of the disputed lands to establish title through a chain of warranty
deeds. The defendant challenged the accuracy of the survey and, in addition, pleaded title through the ten-20 and twenty-five-year 2' limitations
statutes. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant, 22 the court of civil appeals stated that "any ruling by a trial
court on the sufficiency of a survey through which one party claims title
goes to the merits of the case and involves the resolution of genuine issues
of material fact."'23 The court rejected the defendant's argument that because the plaintiff had failed to raise the issue of specificity of the survey at
11. 593 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
12. 153 Tex. 281, 287, 267 S.W.2d 781, 785 (1954).
13. 465 S.W.2d 136, 142-43 (Tex. 1971).
14. 593 S.W.2d at 390.
15. 153 Tex. at 287, 267 S.W.2d at 785.
16. 602 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
17. Id. at 566. Pendley was an action in trespass to try title. Id. at 561.
18. 602 S.W.2d at 565-66. But see Plumb v. Stuessy, 603 S.W.2d 351, 355 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1980, writ granted) (fence built by strangers to enclose other lands does not
inure to the benefit of adverse claimants). See also Dunn v. Davis, 590 S.W.2d 752, 753
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (fencing claimed property, farming part of it, and using part of it as a trash dump found to be sufficient use to support a
claim of adverse title).
19. 596 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
20. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).

21. Id. art. 5519 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
22. 596 S.W.2d at 678.
23. Id. at 679.
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trial, he was precluded from doing so on appeal. 24 Distinguishing the
holding in Montague County v. Howard,25 the court noted that it was the
defendant, and not the plaintiff, who put the specificity of the survey at
issue. 26 The court also noted that a material issue of fact existed as to
whether the defendant's use of the property in dispute was exclusive,
thereby raising an additional issue as to the sufficiency of the defendant's
adverse claim. 27 Under the circumstances, the court concluded that summary judgment was improper. 28
3. Miscellaneous Claims of Title. In Ford v. Moren29 the plaintiff claimed
title to certain land, which was also claimed by the city of Jefferson, Texas.
The city alleged that the land had been dedicated to the public. The court,
finding for the plaintiff, held that the filing of a plat with an area designated as a street is insufficient to dedicate an area unless express language
evidencing a dedication appears on the face of the plat. 30 The court further found that the fact that the city accepted the plat was irrelevant, in
that there was no 3language on the plat or other evidence of an intent to
dedicate the land. '
In the absence of proof of title under a regular chain of title or by adverse possession, a litigant may rely on the doctrine of prior possession 32 to
establish his title. In Walsh v. Austin 33 the plaintiff brought suit in trespass
to try title, alleging that the deed under which the defendants were claiming title was void and that he had been in continuous, peaceful, and exclu34
sive possession under a deed regular on its face for a period of five years.
24. Id. at 680.
25. 590 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ). In Howard the county
sued to enjoin the defendant from building a fence across a roadway. The county failed,
however, to establish the specificity of the road location. Accordingly, the appellate court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 833-34.
26. 596 S.W.2d at 680.
27. Id. at 679.
28. Id. at 679-80; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A.
29. 592 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
30. Id. at 392. The court noted that the elements of dedication are: an intent to dedicate on the part of the owner of the land; manifestation and communication of intention to
dedicate to the applicable governmental entity; and acceptance of the dedication by the public. Id. at 390. See also Owens v. Hockett, 151 Tex. 503, 505, 251 S.W.2d 957, 958 (1952)
(intention to dedicate must be manifested clearly); Aransas County v. Reif, 532 S.W.2d 131,
134 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.) (express dedicatory language on
the plat necessary); County of Calhoun v. Wilson, 425 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1968, writ refd n.r.e.) (inclusion of word reservation on the plat did not raise
presumption of dedication).
31. 392 S.W.2d at 390-91.
32. A claimant in prior possession of real property is deemed to have superior title as
against all claimants other than the rightful owner. Reiter v. Coastal States Gas Producing
Co., 382 S.W.2d 243, 251 (Tex. 1964). To invoke the doctrine of prior possession, the claimant must show: possession prior to that under which the opposing party claims; a chain of
title connecting himself with such possession; exclusive and continuous possession; and the
absence of superior title in the opposing party. See Massey v. Lewis, 281 S.W.2d 471, 477-78
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dean v. Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co.,
58 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tex. Civ. App-Beaumont 1933, no writ).
33. 590 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd).
34. Id. at 615. The plaintiff's possession was actually through his tenants. Id.; see
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The trial court awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff. 35 The appellate court considered whether the plaintiff had the burden of foreclosing all
defenses the defendants would be entitled to raise under their plea of "not
guilty."' 36 The court noted the conflicting case law on this issue, 37 citing
Briggs v. Freeway Park Development Co. 38 and Snider v. Forrest Lumber
Co. 39 In Briggs the court held that a plaintiff in a trespass to try title
action who moves for summary judgment must establish that a defendant
pleading not guilty has no defenses other than that of limitations. 4 0 In
contrast, the court in Snider noted that a "plea of 'not guilty' in a trespass
to try title suit constitutes a mere pleading and nothing more. ' 41 Therefore, under Snider, unless a defendant raises a material issue of fact in
response to a plaintiff's summary judgment motion, the plaintiff will be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 4 2 The Walsh court agreed with
and followed the decision in Snider and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, stating that "there is no valid reason for relieving the defendant of
this burden and placing [it] on the plaintiff to prove the negative-i.e. the
non-existence of a meritorious defense." 43
In Blanar v. Blanar" the defendants in a trespass to try title case moved
onto the plaintiff's land and improved the land with the knowledge that
they neither owned the land nor had any claim under title or color of title
to the land. The defendants acknowledged the plaintiff's title, but counterclaimed for the value of their improvements. The court rejected the defendants' claim summarily, stating that for the improver to obtain relief
under the equitable rule of betterments, he must show that he had reasonable grounds for his belief that he was the true owner of the land.4 5
B. Easements and Other Rights
1. Prescription and Dedication. An easement by prescription may be
proved by showing that use of the easement was open, notorious, hostile,
adverse, uninterrupted, and exclusive for a period of ten years. 46 The
Corder v. Foster, 505 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.) 1973, writ refd
n.r.e.) (adverse claim may be established through possession by tenant).
35. 590 S.W.2d at 613.

36. Id. at 615. TEX. R. Civ. P. 789 governs pleadings in trespass to try title actions and
provides that under a plea of not guilty a "defendant may give in evidence any lawful defense to the action except the defense of limitations, which shall be specially pleaded."
37. 590 S.W.2d at 615.
38. 366 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. 448 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ).
40. 366 S.W.2d at 271. TheBriggs holding was relied on by the court in Gage v. Owen,
396 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1965, no writ).
41. 448 S.W.2d at 135.
42. Id. The Snider court did not cite Briggs as being in conflict with this view.
43. 590 S.W.2d at 616.
44. 598 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. Id. at 382-83; see Miller v. Gasaway, 514 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ) (requiring an examination of the deed records to satisfy the reasonable
grounds for belief requirement).
46. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958); see, e.g., City of Houston v.
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court in Stark v. Morgan4 7 dealt with the issue of whether the claimant of
an easement by prescription must show exclusive use of the right-of-way
claimed. 48 The court, relying on the general rule recently repeated by the
Texas Supreme Court in Brooks v. Jones,49 held that where the record
owner of the property encumbered by the easement used the easement on
occasion, the claimant's use could not be considered adverse.50 In Elliott v.
Elliott5 the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest had used a rightof-way for at least thirty-two years and, accordingly, claimed a prescriptive
easement over the defendants' property. The defendants, record owners of
the tract in dispute, subsequently fenced the right-of-way, cutting off the
plaintiffs' access to a public highway. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
defendants from interfering with their use of the easement. Although the
jury answered special issues in favor of the plaintiffs, the trial judge
granted the defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.5 2 On appeal the court noted that in addition to possession and use, an
adverse claimant must show that he intended to appropriate the land in
dispute. 53 Although the plaintiffs had used the claimed easement for the
prescribed time period, the court held that they had failed to demonstrate
54
the requisite unmistakeable intent to appropriate title to the easement.
The case, consequently, was remanded for a determination of whether the
notify the defendplaintiffs' claim was of such a nature as to reasonably
55
ants that a hostile claim was being asserted.
FirstNationalBank v. Beavers56 involved the question of whether a prescriptive easement can be acquired by flooding a neighbor's land. The defendant's father had built a dam in 1964 that formed a fourteen-acre lake,
seven acres of which covered land belonging to the plaintiff. Nine years
later the father conveyed the land upon which the dam was built to the
defendant by deed. The conveyance did not include a description of the
seven acres of the plaintiff's land that was affected by the lake. After repeated, unsuccessful attempts by the plaintiff and the defendant to settle
their conflicting claims to the submerged land, the plaintiff, in 1975, sued
to enjoin the defendant from maintaining the dam on the defendant's
over the seven
property. The defendant asserted a prescriptive 5easement
7
acres by virtue of the ten-year limitation statute.
On appeal from a denial of injunctive relief,5 8 the plaintiff claimed that
Church, 554 S.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ refd n.r.e.);
Wiegand v. Riojas, 547 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
47. 602 S.W.298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
48. Id. at 306.
49. 578 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex. 1979).
50. 602 S.W.2d at 306.
51. 597 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
52. Id. at 800.
53. Id. at 801.
54. Id.; see Calfee v. Duke, 544 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. 1976).
55. 597 S.W.2d at 803.
56. 602 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
57. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).
58. 602 S.W.2d at 328-29.
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the continuous flooding could not constitute the adverse, continuous, and
exclusive use legally required to establish a prescriptive easement. 59 The
appellate court, in rejecting this claim, 60 relied on a dictum from the early
supreme court case of Haas v. Choussard6 l to the effect that ten years of
uninterrupted use of a dam that caused the flooding of adjoining property
water at the height it had
would establish a right to maintain the dammed
62
been kept throughout the ten-year period.
The plaintiff asserted additional grounds in his effort to defeat the defendant's adverse claim, alleging that because the conveyance to the defendant failed to describe the easement, the defendant could not tack his
time of possession onto that of his father's in order to meet the ten-year
limitation period required by article 5510.63 The claim was based on the
statutory requirement that tacking may occur only when there is privity of
estate between a claimant and his predecessor in interest. 64 The court
noted that a parol transfer of possession, coupled with an actual transfer of
possession, is sufficient to establish privity. 65 In the instant case, the evidence indicated that the defendant had assisted in the construction of the
dam, had paid for the construction, and had intended, as had his father, to
impound water to cover a portion of the plaintiff's land.66 These facts,
together with the defendant's deed to the dominant estate, were held to be
sufficient to prove the requisite privity. 67 Consequently, the court found
that the defendant and his predecessor had enjoyed use of the easement for
the ten-year statutory period. 6 8 The plaintiff additionally argued that the
defendant's attempt to reach a compromise over the disputed land prior to
expiration of the ten-year limitation period constituted an acknowledgment by the defendant of the plaintiff's superior title. 69 The court noted
that while such an acknowledgment may be admissible to show that a
party's claim is not adverse, a limitation claimant "may attempt to 'buy his
peace' without absolutely destroying his . . . claim."' 70 The court found
that because no evidence was introduced showing an outright offer by the
59. Id. at 329.
60. Id.

61. 17 Tex. 588 (1856).
62. Id. at 588-90. The plaintiff in Beavers relied on two cases from foreign jurisdictions
to support his contention that flooding could not establish a prescriptive easement: Simpson
v. Wabash Ry., 145 Mo. 64, 46 S.W. 759 (1898); and Harris v. Southeast Portland Lumber
Co., 123 Or. 549, 262 P. 243 (1927). 602 S.W.2d at 329. The court distinguished these cases,
noting that in Simpson the flooding was permissive, whereas in Harris the claim was to
establish title by adverse possession rather than a claim for a prescriptive easement. Id. at
329-30.
63. 602 S.W.2d at 329.
64. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5516 (Vernon 1958), which provides that
"[p]eaceable and adverse possession need not be continued in the same person, but when
held by different persons successively there must be a privity of estate between them."
65. 602 S.W.2d at 329.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 330.
70. Id. The court cited Bruni v. Vidaurri, 140 Tex. 138, 147-48, 166 S.W.2d 81, 87
(1942), in which the Texas Supreme Court held that whether the purchase by a possessor of
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defendant to purchase the disputed tract or an unequivocal recognition by
the defendant of the plaintiff's superior claim, the defendant's actions and
statements concerning the disputed tract were71 held to be consistent with
the assertion of an easement by prescription.
In Nemir v. Batts72 an adjoining landowner being sued for trespass attempted to establish that his neighbor had impliedly dedicated an easement to the general public73 to travel across the neighbor's land. The
plaintiff had allowed the public to park on the disputed area and the city of
Navasota had maintained a parking lot on the plaintiff's land for the convenience of the public; the plaintiff, however, had continued to pay taxes
on the disputed area. 74 The court found that, at most, the plaintiff had
granted the public a permitted right to use the disputed area as a parking
lot and that because the area had never been used as a roadway prior to
the defendant's trespass, there was75no reason for expanding the public's
right to use the area as a roadway.
2. Express Easements. One of the most litigated issues in the area of
easements relates to the scope and extent of rights granted in an express
easement. 76 In Stout v. Christian7 7 the court was presented with the issue
of what constituted a reasonable use of an express easement by owners of
the dominant estate. Predecessors in title to the defendants, record owners
of the dominant estate, received an express right-of-way grant across the
servient estate. Because the servient estate was used to graze cattle, the
easement explicitly provided that cattle gates were to be erected at the entrance and exit to the roadway and that the gates were to be kept locked
when the roadway was not in use. After the defendants failed to keep the
another's claim to a disputed tract would defeat the possessor's claim depends upon whether
the possessor intended to recognize a conflicting claim to the property in question.
71. 602 S.W.2d at 330.
72. 594 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, no writ).
73. An implied dedication to the public is established by showing that the road in question was expressly or impliedly opened to the public, that the public accepted the dedication
by general and customary use, and that the public would suffer a loss of valuable rights if the
road were closed. See O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 280-81, 339 S.W.2d 878, 882-83
(1960).
74. 594 S.W.2d at 142.
75. Id. at 143. But see Allen v. Keeling, 598 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus
Christi 1980). In Allen the public had acquired a roadway easement by prescription. The
plaintiff-landowner contended that the easement width was limited to the width of the
"beaten path." Id. at 954. The court rejected this claim, holding that the size of a public
easement is determined by the area necessary for public convenience. Id. Thus, under the
facts of this case, the easement was held to include not only the beaten path but also property between the path and a fence maintained by the plaintiff. Id. [Editor's Note: After this
Article went to print, the supreme court reversed the lower court and rendered a judgment
enjoining the defendants from trespassing on the plaintiff's land. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 264, 265
(Mar. 4, 1981).]
76. See, e.g., Raines, supra note 1, at 57-58. See also Moody v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
594 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ret'd n.r.e.), in which the court
held that a pipeline easement which provided for plural pipelines and the right of installation from time to time granted to the easement owner the right to enter upon the servient
estate to install multiple pipelines.
77. 593 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
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gates locked, the plaintiffs locked the gates and furnished the defendants
with keys. The defendants protested this measure, and, on repeated occasions, the locks were broken and surrounding fences were cut. The plaintiffs brought suit for damages and to enjoin the defendants from
interfering with their use and enjoyment of the servient estate.
In affirming the trial court's grant of a temporary injunction, 78 the court
noted that the owner of a dominant estate is obligated to use an easement
in a manner that will not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the
owner of the servient estate. 79 The court held that the explicit language of
the easement granted to the defendants' predecessors in title evidenced an
express intent to protect the servient owners in pursuing the business of
raising cattle. 80 Recognizing that locked gates may, under some circumstances, constitute an unreasonable interference with a dominant owner's
easement rights, the court held that, under the facts presented in this case,
locked gates may be permitted when the easement owners are furnished
with keys. 8'
In Simpson v. PhillpsPipeLine'Co. 82 the court addressed the question of
what is the proper measure of damages when the scope of an express easement is exceeded. In Simpson the defendant, the easement owner, had
entered upon the servient estate to replace its pipeline and, in doing so,
widened the easement into an area that was not reasonably necessary for
laying the pipeline in an efficient manner. The plaintiffs-landowners sued
for damages to the land. The jury calculated the damages as the difference
between the reasonable market value of the entire tract before and after
completion of the pipeline. 83 The trial court, however, granted the defendant's motion to disregard the jury verdict and ordered a new trial on the
issue of damages. 84 At the second trial, the jury awarded damages only in
relation to that excess land used by the defendant during the pipeline
work. 85 The plaintiffs, on appeal from the judgment rendered on that verdict, argued that under the doctrine of trespass ab initio 86 the defendant's
abuse of authority under its easement should make the defendant liable for
all the damage done to the plaintiffs' land. 87 The court of civil appeals, in
78. Id. at 151.
79. Id. at 150; see Texas-Louisiana Power Co. v. Webster, 59 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1933) (owner of power line easement may not prevent owner of dominant
estate from using ground under power line), aft'd, 127 Tex. 126, 91 S.W.2d 302 (1936).
80. 593 S.W.2d at 150.
81. Id. at 149-50. The court relied on its earlier decision in Carleton v. Dierles, 195
S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, no writ), which held that whether the locking of gates constitutes an unreasonable burden on use of a roadway is an issue of fact.
82. 603 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
83. Id. at 309.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Trespass ab initio is a legal fiction by which one who enters land in the exercise of a
lawful right, but who subsequently abuses that right by engaging in conduct that constitutes
a trespass, is held to be liable not only for the later misconduct, but also for the original
lawful entry. See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 214(2), Comment e (1965).
87. 603 S.W.2d at 310.
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affirming the judgment of the trial court,88 cited several authorities that
criticize the doctrine and, accordingly, rejected the doctrine.8 9 Stating that
the defendant should not be "penalized by an outworn legal theory having
no place in . ..modern jurisprudence," 90 the court held that under the
facts of this case the imposition of liability only for damages to the land
that had been unreasonably appropriated was a just result.9 1
C.

Conveyances

In Henderson v. Priest92 the appellant contended that a divorce decree
that merely referenced the parties' home by a street address in Richardson,
Texas, was legally inadequate to pass title and, thus, was ineffective as a
conveyance. 93 The parties owned only one parcel of realty in Richardson.
The court rejected this argument, holding that when a divorce decree
"contains within itself the means or data, by which the particular real
property conveyed was subsequently identified with reasonable certainty" 94 the conveyance is not void. The court stated that under such
evidence is admissible to identify the property with
circumstances extrinsic
95
certainty.
reasonable
In Adamson v. Doornbos96 the plaintiff sought to establish her title to
certain realty under the "common source" rule.97 The common source
rule requires a claimant to connect his and the opposing party's title by a
complete chain to a common source and to prove that his title is superior
to the opposing party's title. 98 In this instance, the plaintiff's title derived
from a quitclaim deed, whereas the defendants' title derived from adverse
possession.9 9 In holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish a common
source of title, the court noted that a quitclaim deed is not a "conveyance
or muniment of title.'' °0 Accordingly, the trial court's determination that
88. Id. at 311.
89. Id.; see I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.21 (1956); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 25 (1971); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 17 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 214(2), Comment e (1965). The Simpson court, in addition, rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the Waco court of civil appeals had adopted the
doctrine of trespass ab initio in Humphreys Oil Co. v. Liles, 262 S.W. 1058 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1924), aft'd, 277 S.W. 100 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgmt adopted). 603
S.W.2d at 309. The court noted that in Humphreys the appellate court treated the claim as
based in nuisance rather than in trespass. Id.
90. 603 S.W.2d at 311.
91. Id.
92. 591 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
93. Id. at 636.
94. Id. (emphasis in original); see Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 210, 223 S.W.2d 222,
223 (1949); Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 56-57, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1945).
95. 591 S.W.2d at 636.
96. 587 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
97. Id. at 446.
98. Jones v. Mid-State Homes, Inc., 163 Tex. 229, 230, 356 S.W.2d 923, 924 (1962).
99. 587 S.W.2d at 446-47. The defendants established that the grantor of their predecessor in title held title by virtue of the 10-year limitations statute. Id. at 447; see TEX. REV.
ClV. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).

100. 587 S.W.2d at 447. See also McMahon v. Fender, 350 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex. Civ.
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the plaintiff had failed to prove superior title was affirmed.' 0 '
D. Damage to Land
The court in B.A. Mortgage Co. v. McCullough 10 2 dealt with the issue of
the proper measure of damages for loss of lateral support caused when the
defendant's agent graded the plaintiff's land down to the level of a private
street that ran along the side of the defendant's property. The plaintiff, in
addition to damages for loss of lateral support, sought recovery for the
amount it would cost to build a retaining wall to restore his land to its
original condition. 0 3 The defendants contended that in the case of damage to realty resulting from removal of lateral support, the correct measure
of damages is the lesser of the amounts of the diminution in the fair market value of the property caused by loss of lateral support or the cost to
repair the damaged property.1°4 The court noted that although the defendants had correctly stated the general rule of damages, 0 5 this rule must
be varied when its application would result in an outcome that would be
unfair or unjust.' 0 6 The court held that, under the circumstances of this
case, if the general rule with respect to damages were applied, the defendants would escape liability for causing a radical change in the plaintiff's
land, because there had been no diminution in the land's fair market
value. 10 7 Thus, the court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded for a determination of the damages, holding the correct measure
08
of damages to be the reasonable cost of building a retaining wall.
E. Title Insurance
In Great American MortgageInvestors v. Louisville Title Insurance Co. 109
a lending institution sued to recover against a title insurance company for
damages sustained due to reliance on negligent misrepresentations contained in a mortgagee's information letter and title policy binder. Ridglea
Park Corporation, the borrower, obtained interim financing from the
plaintiff lending institution for the construction of an apartment complex.
The plaintiff used a local bank to act as its lead lender. Prior to the commencement of construction, the defendant issued to the bank a mortgagee's information letter, which expressly stated that there were no deed
restrictions of record covering the property except for certain restrictions
App.-Waco 1961, writ refd n.r.e.) (title must be established in the grantor for quitclaim
deed to be a conveyance).
101. 587 S.W.2d at 447.
102. 590 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
103. Id. at 956.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 957;see Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309, 318 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1974) (measure of damages in pollution case), af'd, 524 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.
1975).
106. 590 S.W.2d at 957.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 957-58.
109. 597 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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that were referenced by volume and page. The title company issued a second mortgagee's information letter and a mortgagee's title insurance
binder, which indicated that there were no deed restrictions covering the
property. The plaintiff, who was not furnished with the first information
letter, relied on the second information letter and binder and authorized
the loan. Prior to completion of the apartment complex several adjacent
landowners obtained injunctive relief that prohibited the borrower from
any further construction that violated the deed restrictions. In order to
complete construction, the borrower had to demolish some of the previously constructed buildings, alter the exterior of other buildings, and obtain additional land to have the requisite number of square feet of land per
dwelling unit. As a result of the additional expenses, the borrower's loan
went into default and the bank foreclosed. Subsequently, the plaintiff acquired the bank's interest in the project. In a suit for damages" 10 the plaintiff alleged that it first learned of the deed restrictions when the borrower
was enjoined, at which time it was too late to prevent the damage that
already had occurred."' The jury found that plaintiff had been damaged
as a result of its reliance upon the misrepresentation in the title binder and
judgawarded damages of $160,000.112 The trial court, however, entered
3
1
appealed."
plaintiff
the
and
nothing,
take
plaintiff
ment that the
The appellate court was faced with two issues: first, whether the tort of
negligent misrepresentation is recognized in Texas and, if so, whether it
applies to title insurers; secondly, whether the legal relationship between
the plaintiff and the bank prevented the plaintiff from recovering against
the defendant because of the bank's knowledge of the restriction in question.' "4 As to the first issue, the court noted that actions for negligent misrepresentation" 5 have been recognized by Texas courts, 116 noting the
supreme court decision in Stone v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. "17 where
the court held that title insurers may be liable for negligence in the misrepresentation of the state of title in a policy. 118 The court noted additionally
that even though one may not have a duty to act, if one acts voluntarily he
must do so with due care and is generally liable for negligence.' ' 9 Thus,
110. Id. at 427.
111. Id. at 428.
112. Id. at 429.

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(I) (1977) (description of the elements

of negligent misrepresentation).
116. 597 S.W.2d at 429-30; see Rosenthal v. Blum, 529 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Rosenthal court relied on holdings of several of the
courts of civil appeals in finding that negligent misrepresentation constitutes remedial fraud
in Texas. Id.
117. 554 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1977) (liability imposed when defendants know, or, in the

exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the falsity of statements and acts). See
also Lane v. Security Title & Trust Co., 382 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (title insurer may be liable in tort although contractual obligation to issue
title policy fulfilled).
118. 597 S.W.2d at 430.
119. Id.
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whether the defendants had a duty to disclose the existence of a deed restriction was immaterial, because the second information letter and the
title binder expressly represented that there were no deed restrictions in
existence. 120 The court concluded that, having made the representation,
and, therethe defendants should be held to a standard of reasonable care
12
fore, be held liable for damages caused by their negligence. '
As to the second issue, the court found that characterization of the relationship between the plaintiff and the bank was crucial to the resolution of
the plaintiff's claim. 122 This legal relationship was held to be one either of
joint adventure, 123 based on the joint ownership and control of the loan in
question by the plaintiff and the bank, 124 or one of principal-agent, based
on the various contractual arrangements relating to the loan that existed
between the plaintiff and the bank. 125 The court observed that knowledge
of one adventurer concerning the adventure is imputed to the other adventurer,126 and likewise, that knowledge of an agent relating to information
within the scope of its agency is imputed to the principal. 127 In affirming
the take-nothing judgment of the trial court, 128 the court concluded that
the plaintiff could not reasonably have relied on the misrepresentation of
the defendant because the bank's knowledge of the deed restrictions referenced in the first information letter is imputed to the plaintiff as a matter of
law. 129
In Boenker v. American Title Co. 130 the Boenkers, as purchasers, sued
the defendant title company, seeking damages for wrongful failure to close
a real estate transaction. Haley, the seller, filed a separate suit against the
defendant, seeking damages caused by allegedly material misrepresentations made by the defendant's closer. The transaction could not be closed
because of defects in title and the refusal of the Boenkers' lender to authorize the funding of its loan. The court found that as a matter of law, the
Boenkers had no cause of action against the defendant because a title company has no obligation to close a transaction if it is not prepared to issue a
title policy.' 3 1 Summary judgment against the Boenkers was therefore affirmed. 132 With respect to the cause of action instituted by Haley, the
pleadings alleged that as a result of Haley's reliance upon statements made
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 631, 291 S.W.2d 704, 709 (Tex. 1956) (joint adventure

exists when there is community of interest and participation in profits and losses).
124. 597 S.W.2d at 431.
125. Id.
126. See Heinrich v. Wharton County Livestock, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
127. See Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lubbock Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 S.W.2d 448,
450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd).
128. 597 S.W.2d at 434.
129. Id. at 432.
130. 590 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
131. Id. at 779; see Tamburine v. Center Sav. Ass'n, 583 S.W.2d 942, 949 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (title company does not act as an agent for insured).
132. 590 S.W.2d at 780.
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by officials of the title company that the loan to the Boenkers would be
funded within a day or two, Haley permitted the Boenkers to move onto
the property.133 The court noted that the supreme court in Stone' 34 recognized that liability may be imposed on a title insurance company for
fraudulent statements made by its agents. The court held that the granting
of the defendant's motion for summary judgment against Haley was inappropriate in that Haley's pleadings gave rise to an action in tort and that
the fact issues with respect to the tort issue should be decided at a trial on
the merits. 135
II.

PURCHASES AND SALES OF REAL PROPERTY

A. Formation,Performance,and Interpretationof Contracts
1. ContractEnforceability. A number of Texas cases decided during the
survey period involved suits for specific performance. In Sessions v. Cowart 36 the court, affirming the decision of the trial court, found that the
alleged contract did not support a suit for specific performance because the
property description set forth in the contract was too vague, indefinite, and
uncertain to withstand a challenge under the statue of frauds.137 The writing in question did not contain a metes and bounds description, and gave
no information as to the state, county, survey, or location where the land
could be found.' 38 The court cited Williams v. Ellison, 139 in which the
supreme court recited the well-established Texas rule that
the test for determining the sufficiency of the description of land in
contracts to convey land, for compliance with the statute of frauds, is
that "[t]o be sufficient, the writing must furnish within itself, or by
reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which
the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty." 140
In Glass v. Anderson 14 the supreme court examined the effect of two
separate acts of repudiation with respect to the repudiating party's right to
seek specific performance of six earnest money contracts for the sale of
land. Prior to the time for performance of the contracts, the purchaser,
Anderson, who was having trouble obtaining financing, notified the seller,
Glass, that the "deal was off." The seller's attorney then infomed Anderson's attorney that unless the purchaser completed the transaction within a
reasonable time Glass would deem the contracts breached and claim the
escrow deposit as liquidated damages. Later that same month, Anderson's
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 779-80.

Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1977).
590 S.W.2d at 780.
601 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
137. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
138. 601 S.W.2d at 83.
139. 493 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1973).
140. Id. at 736 (quoting Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972)); see Zobel
v. Slim, 576 S.W.2d 362, 369 (Tex. 1978); Cohen v. McCutchin, 565 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.
1978); Rowson v. Rowson, 154 Tex. 216, 219, 275 S.W.2d 468, 470 (1955).
141. 596 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1980).
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attorney again stated that his client had repudiated the contracts and that
he did not intend to close. The following month, however, Anderson notified Glass that he had obtained financing and was ready to close. After
several demands, Glass refused to close, and Anderson brought suit seeking specific performance.
The supreme court found that, because the time for performance had
not yet arrived when Anderson first repudiated the contracts, his action
was merely an anticipatory breach.142 Finding that the seller did not treat
the anticipatory breach as a total breach of the contract, materially change
his position in reliance on the repudiation, or indicate to the other party
that he considered the repudiation final, the court concluded that Anderson was free to retract his first repudiation. 43 Nonetheless, the court observed that because of the first repudiation the seller was not required to
44
deliver the deeds or otherwise tender performance under the contract.
Examining the second act of repudiation, the court noted that ordinarily
time is not of the essence in a contract for the sale of real property unless
the terms of the contract show a clear intent that performance of the contract within the time specified is essential to the right to require performance by the other. 45 While the contract did not expressly provide that
time was of the essence, the supreme court found that because the seller
demanded performance after the contractual time for performance had
146
passed, the seller thereby made time of the essence as a matter of law.
The court further found that the purchaser could not retract the second act
of repudiation because the purchaser materially breached the contract by
failing to perform in a timely manner after the demand for performance
had been made.14 7 The court held that the repudiation of a contract after
the time for performance has passed, together with a total breach of nonperformance, terminates the contract and relieves the nonrepudiating
party of the requirement to take affirmative action or to perform any contractual obligation on his part. 148 Finally, the court concluded that the
equitable remedy of specific performance is not available to a party who
142. Id. at 510; see Herzstein v. Echols & Lynn, 517 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1974, no writ).
143. 596 S.W.2d at 510-11; see 11 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1337, at 185-86
(3d ed. 1968); RESTATMENT OF CONTRACTS § 319 (1932).
144. 596 S.W.2d at 511; see Mathews v. Caldwell, 258 S.W. 810, 813 (Tex. Comm'n App.

1924, judgmt adopted); Dickey v. Johnson, 513 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1974, writ refd n.r.e.); Zucht v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 207 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1947, writ dism'd); Armstrong v. Palmer, 281 S.W. 627, 630 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1920, writ ref'd).
145. 596 S.W.2d at 511; see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 276(e)(i) (1932).
146. 596 S.W.2d at 511; see Limpus v. Armstrong, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 322 N.E.2d 187,
190 (1975).
147. 596 S.W.2d at 513. The supreme court distinguished the cases of Helsley v. Anderson, 519 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ), and Sterling v. Apple, 513
S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ), both of which involved
anticipatory breaches as opposed to actual breaches. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 278(1) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1973).
148. 596 S.W.2d at 513.
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has breached a contract. 4 9
In Hage v. Westgate Square Commercial'50 the seller brought suit for
specific performance of an earnest money contract for the purchase of
land. The purchaser defended on the basis that the contract expressly provided that time was of the essence and, therefore, when the transaction
failed to close within the specified time, the contract became unenforceable. The court found that although the contract in question did provide
that time is of the essence and that the transaction was not closed within
the time period specified, the closing had been delayed as a result of extensions requested by the purchaser.' 5 ' The court noted that even where time
is of the essence by express stipulation in a contract, the stipulated time
limit may be extended by the parties' waiver of strict compliance. 5 2 The
purchaser further contended that the contract was not enforceable because
it did not satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. 53 The contract
provided that the purchase price for the property was payable by the delivery of two promissory notes, each secured by deeds of trust covering a
separate portion of the property. Although the contract sufficiently described the land as a whole, the purchaser argued that failure to describe
adequately the two portions of land to be secured by deed of trust violated
the statute of frauds. The court noted that the alleged deficiency related
"solely to the manner of payment and the method for securing payment of
the consideration."' 5 4 The court found that under established Texas law,
the statute of frauds does not require that the consideration or the terms of
payment in a contract for sale of realty be expressed in writing.15 5 The
court concluded that the failure of a contract to provide fundamental provisions of the deeds of trust, including a description of the land to be cov56
ered thereby, does not render the contract unenforceable.1
In McDaniel v. Kudlik 5 7 the purchasers under an earnest money contract for the sale of real property sought specific performance or, in the
alternative, a return of their escrow deposit. The contract provided that
the purchaser was to assume the seller's first lien mortgage covering the
property or, in the event the purchasers were unable to obtain the consent
of the lender, the contract would be modified to provide for the sale of the
land under a conditional sales contract. The court, citing Glass v. Anderson,158 found that the purchasers were not entitled to relief, equitable or
149. Id.; see Ferguson v. Kindle, 396 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Mo. 1965); Bell v. Rudd, 144 Tex.
491, 497, 191 S.W.2d 841, 843-44 (1946).

150. 598 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
151. Id. at 711; see Dracopoulas v. Rachel, 411 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. 1967); Puckett v.
Hoover, 146 Tex. 1, 5-6, 202 S.W.2d 209, 212 (1947); Smith v. Hues, 540 S.W.2d 485, 488
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
152. 598 S.W.2d at 711.
153. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
154. 598 S.W.2d at 712.
155. Id.; see Botello v. Misener-Collins Co., 469 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. 1971); Garcia v.
Karam, 154 Tex. 240, 244, 276 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1955).
156. 598 S.W.2d at 712; see Johnson v. Snell, 504 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. 1974).
157. 598 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
158. 596 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Tex. 1980).
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otherwise, if the seller chose to refuse to honor the contract, because the
purchaser's failure to make an effort to obtain approval for assumption of
the first lien constituted a breach of contract. 59 The court concluded that
the sellers were entitled to retain the escrow deposit as liquidated damages
in accordance with the provisions of the contract. 60 In Jones v. Kelley16'
the sellers appealed from a judgment entitling the purchaser to specific
performance of earnest money contracts for the sale of land. The seller
alleged that the two contracts violated the statute of frauds because the
62
description contained in one of the contracts was legally insufficient.
Applying the established Texas rule that a written contract executed in
several instruments relating to a single transaction or purpose is to be construed and treated as one contract, the court denied the seller's contention. 63 The court noted that when written contracts or memoranda
contain statements of ownership and extrinsic evidence shows that the
seller owns only one tract of land answering the description, the contract
will be deemed to identify the land with reasonable certainty so as to satisfy the statute of frauds.' 64
In Land Locators of Texas, Inc. v. La Cour Du Roi, Inc. 165 the parties
entered into a contract that expressly obligated the plaintiff to exercise an
option to purchase twenty-seven tracts of land and to convey such tracts to
the defendant free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. The contract,
however, was silent as to the plaintiff's right to require reimbursement for
the cost of the tracts from the defendant. Despite evidence in the record
that the defendant never intended to reimburse the plaintiff, the plaintiff
alleged that an implied obligation existed on the part of the defendant to
pay a reasonable price for the land. The court refused to apply the implied
covenant rule, noting that a covenant will be implied only when it is evident from the express terms of the contract that the parties clearly intended
the existence of the covenant. 66 The court also refused to accept the
plaintiff's allegation of mutual mistake, concluding that if a mistake was
made, the mistake was unilateral, and that an agreement
will not be set
67
aside unless the other party induced the mistake.
159. 598 S.W.2d at 351.
160. Id. at 352.
161. 602 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980). [Editor's Note: After this Arti-

cle went to print, the supreme court affirmed the lower court on the statute of frauds issue,
but reformed the judgment to provide for attorney's fees. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 269, 273 (Mar.
4, 1981).]
162. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
163. 602 S.W.2d at 575; see Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex.
258, 267, 239 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1951); Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 348, 159 S.W.2d 472,
475 (1942); Libby v. Noel, 581 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
164. 602 S.W.2d at 576 (citing Komiec v. Reagan, 556 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1977)).
165. 592 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. Id. at 8; see Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Tex. 439,
450, 6 S.W.2d 1039, 1041 (1928); Emmord's, Inc. v. Obermiller, 526 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Tex.
Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
167. 592 S.W.2d at 9; see Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Pruitt, 539 S.W.2d 356, 362 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
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In Harrisv. Rowe 168 the supreme court addressed the issues of accord
and satisfaction and the doctrine of merger in a suit for damages for
breach of a construction contract. The trial court's grant of an instructed
verdict in favor of Harris, the seller, was overturned by the court of civil
appeals.' 69 The supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals decision
and reinstated the trial court's instructed verdict. Under the original terms
of the contract, the seller agreed to complete construction of a house by
September 8, at which time title would pass to the purchaser. At the purchaser's request, the parties agreed to an earlier closing date of July 7. On
July 7 certain items of construction were not yet completed, but the transaction was consummated with the understanding that the seller would
complete construction within thirty days. The purchaser withheld a portion of the purchase price and escrowed the sum with a title company,
which was to disburse the money to the seller when the seller completed
the remaining construction. The escrow agreement listed the remaining
items and allocated portions of the escrowed amount for the specific items
in question. Construction of the items was not completed by the seller,
and after the title company refused to return the escrowed amount, the
purchaser instituted a suit for damages for breach of the original contract.
The seller claimed that he and the purchaser had reached an accord and
satisfaction by the execution of the July 7 escrow agreement and alternatively alleged that the original contract had merged into the general warranty deed delivered by the seller at the closing. The court noted that it is
the responsibility of the defendant to establish the affirmative defense of
accord and satisfaction and stated that "[t]his defense rests upon a new
of
contract, express or implied, in which the parties agree to the discharge 170
an existing obligation in a manner otherwise than originally agreed."'
The court stated that the new contract, which constitutes an alternate satisfaction of existing contractual obligations, is made upon the condition that
the acceptance will constitute a discharge of the original obligation.' 7 '
The court held that the escrow agreement was certain in its meaning, and
that the seller and the purchaser entered into an accord and satisfaction
that was a bar to a suit for damages under the original contract.' 72 The
court further found that the doctrine of merger was inapplicable to the
rights collateral
case at hand because a contract of sale of land that creates
173
to or independent of the deed survives the conveyance.
The dissent in Harris disagreed with the majority's determination that
the July 7 agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction as a matter of
law. 174 The dissent argued that the evidence raised a fact issue for the jury
168. 593 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1979).

169. 576 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), rev'd, 593 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1979).
170. 593 S.W.2d at 306.
171. Id.; see Jenkins v. Henry C. Beck Co., 449 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1969); Ortiz Oil
Co. v. Geyer, 138 Tex. 373, 377, 159 S.W.2d 494, 496 (1942).
172. 593 S.W.2d at 306.
173. Id. at 307.
174. 593 S.W.2d at 307-08 (Spears, J., dissenting).

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

to determine and that, therefore, an instructed verdict was improper. 75
Viewing the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, the dissent concluded
that the seller had failed to make an "unmistakeable communication" that
he intended the July 7 agreement to be a complete discharge of all underlying obligations. 176
2. Measure of Damages. Two cases decided during the survey period
dealt with the measure of damages in an action for breach of contract.
Generally, the law provides that the measure of damages for breach of a
contract to sell real estate is the difference between the contract price and
market value of the property at the time of the breach. 177 The general rule
normally is applied when a vendor has the ability to perform the contract
in question but is unwilling to do so. In Long v. Brown 178 the court applied a different rule. That case involved the sale of a tract of land that
was encumbered at the time the contract was executed. The seller was
unable to deliver good and marketable title, free and clear of an existing
encumbrance, because the lender holding the encumbrance was unwilling
to release the lien of its deed of trust for the reason that the property being
sold was security for another debt as well. The court held that when a
seller is willing to complete the contract but is unable to consummate the
transaction, in the absence of fraud, the correct measure of damages available to a purchaser is the return of the purchase money paid, plus inter79
est.
In Bair v. Voelker Realty Co. 180 the purchaser of a tract of land executed
and delivered a nonrecourse note secured by a deed of trust, which provided that the purchaser had a right to destroy certain buildings on the
property; however, in the event the seller recovered the property through
foreclosure proceedings, the purchaser was obligated to pay the seller the
sum of $25,000 as compensation for the destroyed buildings. Prior to the
maturity date of the note, the purchaser reconveyed the land to the seller,
under a general warranty deed that the seller accepted and recorded.
Thereafter, the seller brought suit for $25,000 as damages for the destroyed
buildings. The purchaser alleged that foreclosure was a condition precedent to recovery of the damages for destruction of the buildings, and the
court agreed. The court further found that the voluntary reconveyance of
the property prior to default was not a foreclosure.' 8 ' The seller con175. Id. at 308; see Jenkins v. Henry C. Beck Co., 449 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1969).
176. 593 S.W.2d at 308.
177. See Broady v. Mitchell, 572 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Roselawn Cemetery, Inc. v. Martin, 415 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1967, no writ); Best Bldg. Co. v. Sikes, 394 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1965, writ ref d n.r.e.); Elliot v. Henck, 223 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
178. 593 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
179. Id. at 372; see Nelson v. Jenkins, 214 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1948, writ refd); Herbert v. Denman, 44 S.W.2d 441,443 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931,
writ refd).
180. 589 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
181. Id. at 869.
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tended alternatively that the purchaser made performance of the condition
precedent impossible by reconveying the property.' 82 The court noted,
however, that the seller could have declined to accept the deed, foreclosed
the lien of the deed of trust after default, and thereafter sued for the compensation she sought;' 8 3 however, because she chose to accept the 84deed,
she had no right of compensation as set forth in the deed of trust.'
3. Rescission. In National Resort Communities, Inc. v. Holleman 185 the
purchaser sought rescission of an executed contract for a deed. The plaintiffs claimed that they had entered into a contract for sale in reliance upon
a false promise made by the defendant's sales agent that a dirt road leading to the lot in question would be paved immediately. Although the facts
were disputed, the court, in holding for the plaintiff, concluded that the
evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's findings that a promise
was made, that the promise was false and material, that the promise was
made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiffs to enter into the contract,
and that the plaintiffs relied on the promise. 186 The court further noted
that in a suit for rescission there is no requirement that the plaintiff show
the amount of actual damages,' 87 and held that the fact that the evidence
damage was sufficient to supclearly showed that the plaintiffs did suffer188
rescission.
for
judgment
a
of
entry
port an
B.

Representations and Warranties,Fraud

Numerous decisions rendered during the survey period dealt with causes
of action brought under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices--Consumer
Protection Act (DTPA)189 In Anderson v. Havens, 190 a suit instituted by
the seller of a tract of land for damages for breach of contract, the purchaser refused to close the transaction because of an alleged breach of the
seller's oral assurances that the sale also entitled the purchaser to the crops
existing on the land at the time the contract was to be closed. The purchaser defended his failure to consummate the transaction contemplated
by the contract by asserting the affirmative defense of fraudulent representation. The court noted the elements of common law fraudulent represen182. The seller also asserted that she became the owner of the property as a result of
"foreclosure under the deed of trust," relying on Jones v. Ford, 583 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.), which held that a conveyance by a mortgagor to a
noteholder had the effect of a foreclosure as between the noteholder and third parties. The
court held that the decision in Jones did not apply to the case at hand because the note in
Jones was in default and the conveyance was not made under a general warranty deed. 589
S.W.2d at 869.
183. 589 S.W.2d at 869-70.
184. Id.
185. 594 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
186. Id. at 196-97; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968).
187. 594 S.W.2d at 197; see Texas Indus. Trust v. Lusk, 312 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1958, writ ref'd).
188. 594 S.W.2d at 197-98.
189. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
190. 595 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
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tation that were present in this case: a material representation was made;
the representation was false; the representation was known by the maker to
be false when made, or was made recklessly without any knowledge of its
truth and as a positive assertion; the representation was made with the
intention that the persons to whom it was directed would act upon it; the
persons to whom it was directed acted in reliance on it; and they suffered
damages. 19' The court found that the evidence showed that the purchaser,
in signing the contract, relied on the oral assurances that the crops would
follow the land.' 92 In addition, the court found that the trial court properly admitted parol evidence with respect to the fraudulent representation
because fraud is an exception to the parol evidence rule.' 93 Citing Woods
v. Littleton,194 the court further noted that the DTPA applied to real estate
transactions. If a consumer is adversely affected by any of the false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices declared unlawful in section
17.46,195 section 17.50196 provides that he may maintain an action under
the statute. Representing that an agreement confers or involves rights that
it does not have is a deceptive trade practice.197 The court noted that "the
definition of consumer includes an individual who seeks any goods, and
the definition of goods includes real property purchased for use."' 198 The
seller argued that the definition of goods in section 17.45(1) was limited to
"tangible real property purchased" and, therefore, the DTPA did not apply to this transaction because the executory contract was never consummated. The court rejected the seller's contention, finding that a real estate
purchase need not be consummated to be covered by the DTPA. 199 The
court determined that the transaction was covered by the DTPA because
the purchaser was a consumer who sought to purchase real estate for
use. 2°° Notwithstanding the court's determination, the court found that
suffered and,
the purchaser had offered no evidence as to any damage
20 '
nothing.
take
should
purchaser
the
that
ruled
therefore,
In Ratcl/f v. TrenhoIm20 2 the defendant, a land developer, held a
"draw" meeting for homebuilders in order to advertise and explain the
proposed development of a project to be located in Piano, Texas. At the
meeting, the defendant made a sales presentation to the plaintiff and other
homebuilders. The plaintiff selected and purchased several lots on which
homes were later built, and, although some homes were sold at a profit, the
191. Id. at 152; see Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138,
143 (Tex. 1974).
192. 595 S.W.2d at 153.
193. Id.; see Albers v. Schumacher Co., 314 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, no
writ).
194. 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
195. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
196. Id. § 17.50. Consumer as used in § 17.46 is defined in id. § 17.45.
197. Id. § 17.46(b)(12).
198. 595 S.W.2d at 155.
199. Id. at 156.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 157-58.
202. 596 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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plaintiff suffered a net loss overall. The plaintiff brought suit under the
DTPA and under the statute governing fraud in real estate and stock transactions, 20 3 alleging that the defendant made certain deceptive, false, and
misleading representations upon which the plaintiff relied in purchasing
the lots and, further, that the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the
false representations. The alleged false representations involved statements by the defendant that a trailer park near the entrance of the development would be timely moved, that an elementary school would be built
promptly on a nearby tract, that a bridge would be built along a nearby
road by mid-year 1976, and that the residences to be built in the development would contain a minimum of 2,200 square feet.
In considering the recovery the plaintiff sought under the DTPA, the
court stated that in enacting the DTPA, the Texas Legislature did not intend to govern the commercial relationship involving merchants, but
rather had sought to create an effective remedy for individuals, partner2 °4
ships, and corporations placed at a disadvantage in the marketplace.
The court, therefore, found it reasonable to infer that the purchase of
goods for commercial purposes, such as for resale or for use in production
of other goods, was not within the contemplation of the DTPA and that,
inasmuch as the plaintiff did not acquire the lots for use but rather for
resale, he clearly occupied the status of a merchant. 20 5 Because at the time
the plaintiff's cause of action accrued merchants and those planning commercial or business uses were excepted from the coverage of the DTPA,
the court ruled that the plaintiff was not a consumer as contemplated2 °6by
the DTPA, and consequently was not afforded a remedy thereunder.
Further, the court found that as a matter of law, the record showed that
the plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action in fraud under section
27.01, which provides that fraud in a real estate transaction consists of a
false promise to do some act in the future, that promise being material and
made with the intention not to perform. 20 7 The court found that the evidence supported the defendant's contentions that none of the representations made by him at the "draw" meeting were actionable because the
statements were meant to do nothing more than make a prediction of what
would happen in the future and, therefore, no false promise was made to
perform any act in the future. 20 8 In addition the court noted that some of
the statements made by the defendant were made on the basis of information that he had obtained from others and that Texas law provides that any
action in fraud may not be based upon statements expressly represented to
be made on information. 20 9 The court noted that although section 27.01
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968).
596 S.W.2d at 649.
Id.
Id. at 648.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(2) (Vernon 1968). The court noted that

the statute was penal in nature and must be strictly construed. 596 S.W.2d at 650.
208. Id. at 650-51.

209. Id. at 651; see Boles v. Aldridge, 107 Tex. 209, 212, 175 S.W. 1052, 1053 (1915).
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was not applicable to the facts at hand, the plaintiff's right to recover damages for fraud under common law rules of equitable jurisprudence should
not be defeated, because section 27.01 neither supersedes the common law
rules nor provides any exclusive remedy for the recovery of damages in an
action based upon fraud in a transaction involving real estate. 2 10 At common law an expression of an opinion as to a happening in the future may
constitute fraud and deceit when the speaker purports to have special
knowledge as to facts that will occur or exist in the future. 2 1' Because it
appeared from the plaintiff's pleadings as well as the evidence offered at
the trial that the facts in the situation would be sufficient to raise the issue
of common law fraud and deceit, the court remanded the case so as to
allow the plaintiffs to pursue their common law action of fraud and de12
ceit. 2
In Young v. DeGuerin 2 13 the court applied the DTPA in a case in which
the purchaser of a townhouse sued for a breach of implied warranty of
suitability for human habitation and workmanlike construction. The court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the measure of damages for defects
that can be remedied without impairing the building as a whole is the reasonable cost of remedying the defect. 2 14 The court noted, however, that in
the absence of actual physical injury, the award of damages for mental
anguish was inappropriate because section 17.50 of the DTPA makes no
21 5
provision for the recovery of such damages.
In Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc. 21 6 the purchasers of real estate
brought suit against a real estate broker claiming a violation of the DTPA.
In listing the home for sale, the broker, based on information obtained
from the seller, caused a description of the house to be published in a
multiple-listing service guide that stated that the house contained 2,400
square feet of livable space. After the purchasers acquired the house a
subsequent appraisal revealed that the house contained only 2,245 square
feet of livable space. The court noted that the defendant was acting as an
agent for the seller 217 and its liability, if any, must be predicated upon the
210. 596 S.W.2d at 651; accord, Sherrod v. Bailey, 580 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also El Paso Dev. Co. v. Ravel, 339 S.W.2d
360 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ refd n.r.e.) (deals with predecessor provision to
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968)).
211. See Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories v. Bell, 386 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas
1964, writ dism'd).
212. 596 S.W.2d at 652.
213. 591 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
214. Id. at 297.
215. Id. at 300. See generally Dennis Weaver Chevrolet v. Chadwick, 575 S.W.2d 619
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (analyzes the issue of mental anguish as
an element of damages under the DTPA).
216. 599 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980). [Editor's Note: After this Article went to print, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals and
rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 265, 269 (Mar. 4, 1981). This decision will be discussed in next year's Survey.]
217. The seller was not made a party to the suit, and the court did not pass on the seller's
liability. 599 S.W.2d at 684.
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common law rules of principal and agent. 2' 8 Although an agent generally
has no liability for contracts made by him for the benefit of his principal,
the court noted that personal liability to third persons for damages could
arise under certain circumstances. At common law, an agent becomes liable to an injured party only if: the agent is put on actual notice of the
misrepresentation; or in the exercise of attempting to verify the representation of the principal, the agent determines that the representation is false,
and continues to make such representation with knowledge of its falsity; or
the agent, in undertaking to verify the accuracy of the principal's represen2 9
tation, negligently fails to uncover some evidence of misrepresentation. 1
The court found that none of these three conditions applied to the broker
in Cameron. The court ruled that the DTPA requires that where a noninsurance-related claim is involved, an injured party must be a consumer
as that term is defined in the DTPA, and that there must exist some privity
between the alleged consumer and the defendant. 220 The court found that
although the requirement of privity has been held inapplicable in many
instances under the DTPA, when a broker acts solely as an agent and does
not have the potential of becoming a party in the chain of title, the DTPA
has not altered the common law rules of agency. 22 1
Ozuna v. Delaney Realty, Inc., 222 decided by the supreme court in a per
curiam opinion, also dealt with the liability of a real estate agent under the
DTPA. The suit was not instituted on an agency basis; rather, the suit was
a direct action against the real estate agent by the purchaser of realty
under the provisions of the DTPA.223 In Ozuna the defendant acted as the
real estate agent in a transaction in which the plaintiffs purchased a house
and lot. Within a year and a half after the closing, the house was subjected
to extensive flooding. Thereafter the plaintiffs brought suit under the
DTPA against the sellers and the defendant agent. The suit instituted
against the sellers was based upon the allegation that the sellers knew that
the property was subject to flooding and misrepresented that fact to the
plaintiffs, and that such a misrepresentation was a deceptive trade practice
under the DTPA. The suit against the defendant was based upon the allegation that the defendant should have known that flooding conditions existed and should have notified the plaintiffs of such fact. The real estate
224
agent appealed from the trial court judgment for the plaintiffs.
The court of civil appeals focused on the plaintiffs' status as consumers. 225 The court determined that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs
218. Id. at 682.
219. Id. See generally Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories v. Bell, 386 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ.
App. -Dallas 1964, writ dism'd) (alleged misrepresentations as to fowl cholera vaccine).
220. 599 S.W.2d at 683.
221. Id.
222. 600 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam).
223. Delany Realty, Inc. v. Ozuna, 593 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980).
224. Id. at 797.
225. The court of civil appeals reviewed the following cases in considering whether the
purchasers were consumers in their relationship with the defendant: Highline Elec. Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 587 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff
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were consumers with respect to their cause of action against the defendant
because the plaintiffs did not purchase the property from the defendant,
nor did they pay anything to the defendant for any services rendered by
the defendant. 226 In refusing the plaintiffs' application for a writ of error,
the supreme court stated that because there was no evidence presented that
the defendants made any representation, either affirmatively or by omission, concerning the tendency of the house to flood, there was no evidence
presented that the defendant had ever engaged in a deceptive act or practice that would subject the defendant to liability under the DTPA.227 The
supreme court, however, expressly noted that its decision should not be
interpreted as impliedly approving the court of civil appeals' discussion
concerning the plaintiffs' status as consumers under the DTPA. 228 Thus,
229
the court reserved this question of statutory construction for the future.
In another case decided during the survey period, Johnson v. Willis, 230 a
purchaser of real property instituted suit against the sellers and the surveyor, the real estate agent, and the title company involved in the transaction, seeking monetary damages sustained as a result of alleged violations
of the DTPA. The appellate court, in reversing and remanding the case,
found the purchaser's petition insufficient for failure to designate or state
with particularity those acts or events that were relied upon as a basis for
liability under the DTPA,23 ' and thus did not provide the defendants with
sufficient notice of facts upon which the purchaser relied in bringing the
action against them. 232 The court also addressed the question of the submission of liability issues, stating that in a real estate transaction under the
DTPA the broad jury submission of special issues on which liability could
be predicated constituted error because such a submission failed to limit
the jury's consideration to the specific acts relating to the transaction involved. 233 On the damages issue, the court emphasized that the proper
was not a consumer because the alleged misrepresentations of the insurance adjuster were
not made in connection with any actual or prospective sale or lease in which the plaintiff was
seeking or acquiring goods or services supplied by the defendant); Exxon Corp. v. Dunn, 581
S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ) (because the plaintiff had not been
charged for and did not pay for work done on his automobile air conditioner, he was not a
consumer); Thompson v. First Austin Co., 572 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (even though a lender had failed to comply with a letter to the plaintiffs promising not to foreclose a deed of trust, the plaintiffs were not consumers because
they had not purchased services from the lender but merely had purchased the use of
money); Russell v. Hartford Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ
refd n.r.e.) (plaintiffs not consumers because they did not purchase or lease rental car that
initially had been provided by their insurer and later cancelled).
226. 593 S.W.2d at 800.
227. 600 S.W.2d at 782.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 596 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
231. The DTPA did not provide a remedy for deceptive acts in real estate transactions
until Sept. 1, 1975. The transaction in question involved a series of events that occurred
both before and after the effective date of the amendment to the DTPA, but the plaintiff did
not identify the particular events forming the basis of the complaint. Id. at 260.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 260-61.
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measure of damages is the difference between the value paid for the land
and the value of the land as received, or the difference between the value
of the land as received, whichever
of the land as represented and the value
234
measure affords the greatest recovery.
The court in Hollifield v. CoronadoBuilding, Inc. 235 dealt with the issues
of breach of warranty and statute of limitations. In Hollifeld the defendant built a new house and conveyed the house to the plaintiffs on January
13, 1973, by warranty deed. Prior to the closing, the plaintiffs discovered a
severe leak in the house and promptly brought the situation to the attention of the defendant's salesman. The plaintiffs were informed that the
leaks would be repaired prior to closing; subsequent to closing, however,
the repairs had not been made. The plaintiffs made additional oral and
written complaints to the defendant. The defendant made several attempts
to rectify the defective conditions over a period of approximately three
years, but with little success. In 1976 the plaintiffs notified the defendant
in writing of the continued defects and damages, instructed the defendant
to cease further attempts to repair, and demanded compensation for the
decrease in the value of the house or, in the alternative, the amount necessary to place the house in the condition expected for its age. The defendant made no further attempt to repair the house and did not compensate
the plaintiffs for the alleged damages. The plaintiffs filed an action under
the DTPA in 1976.236 The trial court found that the defendant had
breached an implied warranty by selling the plaintiffs a house containing
leaks and failing to promptly correct the defects. 237 The trial court further
held that the plaintiffs were consumers under the DTPA and that the defendant engaged in a trade or commerce thereunder; 238 the court, however,
concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiffs' cause of action was barred
by the two-year statute of limitations. 239 The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs on the basis that the cause
of action was governed by the four-year 24° and not the two-year statute of
limitations 24 ' because a one-year written warranty and other correspondence constituted a contract in writing.242 Relying on the supreme court's
decision in Humber v. Morton,243 which held that a builder of a new home
implicitly warrants that the house is constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and is suitable for human habitation, the court upheld the
234. Id. at 262-63.
235. 594 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
236. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.

§§ 17.50(a)(l)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981), which provide for the maintenance of actions
when the producing cause of actual damages is the breach of an express or implied warranty, or unconscionable course of action, and id. § 17.46(b)(7), which provides that it is a
deceptive trade practice to make false representations as to the quality of goods and services.
237. 594 S.W.2d at 215.
238. Id.
239. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958).
240. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
241. 594 S.W.2d at 216.
242. Id.
243. 426 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968).
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trial court's finding that the warranty had been breached by the defend2
ant. 44
The plaintiffs in Lerma v. Brecheisen24 5 instituted an action against the
defendant under the DTPA, alleging damages by reason of the defendant's
violation of the property management agreement under which the defendant had agreed to manage certain real property owned by the plaintiffs.
The trial court found that the defendant committed a false, misleading, or
deceptive act by representing that his management services had certain
benefits that they did not have. 24 6 The appellate court found that the
plaintiff was a consumer under the DTPA, and that the evidence, although
greatly disputed, was sufficient to support the trial court's judgment for the
plaintiffs.

247

C. Real Estate Brokers
Boyles v.Thompson 248 involved allegations of tortious interference with
contractual relationships. In Boyles a real estate broker sued the purchaser
and the seller for a commission, alleging that the purchaser had interfered
tortiously with the plaintiff's contractual rights for payment of the commission. The contracts for the sale of the land provided that the seller
would pay the broker a six percent commission; the purchaser, however,
refused to close the transaction and agreed to forfeit the escrow deposit
that was shared by the broker and the seller. Shortly thereafter, the purchaser acquired the property from the seller upon essentially the same
terms and conditions without payment of a commission to the broker. The
court of civil appeals upheld the finding by the trial court that the broker
was the procuring cause of the sale and, thus, was entitled to the commission provided in the original contracts. 249 The court further found that
although the purchaser legally had the right to breach the original contract, he did not thereafter have the right to make the same purchase, if the
with the broker's contract and to
motivation for the breach was to25interfere
0
deprive him of his commission.
UTL Corp. v. Marcus 25' involved the authority of a real estate broker to
bind its principal. The plaintiff-purchaser brought suit for breach of contract, and the defendant alleged that the contract failed to satisfy the statute of frauds.252 The plaintiff alleged the existence of a contract by reason
of a listing agreement between the defendant and the broker, which agreement allegedly designated the broker as a general agent with power of sale
244.
245.
246.
ANN. §
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
S.W.2d

594 S.W.2d at 216.
602 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
Such an act is defined as a deceptive trade practice by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
17.46(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
602 S.W.2d at 320.
585 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
Id. at 829.
Id. at 833.
589 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968); see Rankin v. Naftalis, 557
940 (Tex. 1977).
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for the defendant, and which allegedly constituted an offer that was accepted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleged that he was a thirdparty beneficiary of the listing agreement. After lengthy negotiations, the
plaintiff made an offer that materially differed from the terms of the listing
agreement; no written contract, however, had been entered into between
the plaintiff and the defendant. The court held that a real estate broker is a
special agent with the limited authority to show a property and find a purchaser, and as a general rule, a broker does not have the authority to consummate a contract on behalf of a seller. 253 Further, the court stated that
if the listing agreement had constituted an offer, acceptance had to come
without variation to constitute a contract. 254 The terms of the listing
agreement were changed materially in the offer submitted by the plaintiff,
which constituted a counteroffer. 255 The court further found that in order
for the plaintiff to be a third-party beneficiary of the listing agreement, the
parties to the agreement must actually have intended256
the plaintiff to be the
beneficiary at the time they signed the listing letter.
In Browder v. Hughes 257 the court dealt with the issue of whether the
foreclosure of a deed of trust constituted payment of a note, thereby entitling the real estate brokers to payment of brokerage notes. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying the brokers' relief.258 The court
found that because payment of the brokers' notes was expressly contingent
upon payment to the seller of its deferred purchase price, the notes constituted special contracts and, thus, payment to the seller was a condition
precedent to the brokers' recovery. 259 The court further found that the fact
that the foreclosure bid equaled the face amount of the purchase money
note did not constitute payment and did not create liability where none
260
had existed.
In Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Cushman &
253. 589 S.W.2d at 784 (citing Loma Vista Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 142 Tex. 686, 180
S.W.2d 922 (1944); Goode v. Westside Developers, Inc., 258 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
254. 589 S.W.2d at 784; see Garcia v. Villarreal, 478 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1971, no writ).
255. 589 S.W.2d at 784. But see United Concrete Pipe Corp. v. Spin-Line Co., 430
S.W.2d 360 (Tex. 1968) (performance of requested act by offeree may constitute acceptance
although terms of acceptance were changed).
256. 589 S.W.2d at 785; see Suthers v. Booker Hosp. Dist., 543 S.W. 723 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); Taggart v. Crews, 521 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1975, no writ).
257. 597 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
258. Id. at 528.
259. Id. The court distinguished the holdings of Adams v. Johnson, 298 S.W. 265 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted), and Elmen v. Winfield, 80 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1935, writ dism'd), stating that in those cases the notes were regular on
their face, attached personal liability to the makers, and granted the holders the right to
demand payment. 597 S.W.2d at 527-28. The court instead relied on a more recent Nevada
case, Ferrara v. Firsching, 91 Nev. 254, 533 P.2d 1351 (1975), which addressed the issue of
special contracts similar to the one at bar, holding that payment to the seller was a condition
precedent to the broker's recovery. 597 S.W.2d at 528.
260. 597 S.W.2d at 528.
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Wakefield of Texas, Inc. 261 the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether or not a listing agreement identified the real estate in question
with sufficient certainty to make the agreement enforceable. The listing
agreement contained no address, street, city, state, or legal description;
rather, it simply described the property as Park Central VI. The trial
court, noting that real estate is identifiable with reasonable certainty only if
specific reference to its location is made in the instrument creating the obligation, held that the listing agreement was void. 262 Noting that Texas
courts have provided that if a description affords the means of identification it is deemed to be sufficient, 263 the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for
a trial on the factual issue raised by the defendant's contention that a party
familiar with Dallas, Texas, could with reasonable certainty identify the
real estate in question from the description of Park Central VI.264
III.

A.

REAL ESTATE FINANCING

Priorityand Validity of Liens

In Doerge v. National Bank of Commerce 265 an investor purchased a
tract of land and engaged the seller, a developer, to obtain interim and
permanent financing and to construct an apartment project on the land.
The purchaser agreed to subordinate his ownership position in the land to
the lien of a construction mortgage, but retained certain approval rights
with respect to such financing. No deed or other evidence of the plaintiff's
ownership ever was recorded. The seller subsequently obtained financing
exceeding the amount of the plaintiff's subordination obligation, which
was never approved by the plaintiff. To obtain funding of the loan, the
seller submitted to the bank a financial statement that contained a footnote
revealing the purchaser's ownership interest. The statement was reviewed
both by the bank officer in charge of the loan and the bank's credit department. The loan was secured by a deed of trust lien covering the land.
When the lender foreclosed the construction mortgage, the purchaser
sought to recover from the lender all proceeds of the foreclosure sale in
excess of the amount of construction debt that was secured by the property
on the date of the unrecorded conveyance to him. The purchaser contended that the bank's lien was subordinate to his ownership interest because the bank either knew, or had sufficient information to cause it to
inquire, about the purchaser's ownership in that the bank possessed and
reviewed the financial statement. The federal district court determined
that the bank was looking to the financial statement as a source of information on the credit standing of the borrower and not for the disclosure of
261.

618 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1980).

262. Id. at 365.
263. See Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945); Oak Cliff Realty Corp. v.
Mauzy, 354 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.); Krueger v.
W.K. Ewing Co., 139 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940, no writ).
264. 618 F.2d at 366.
265. 482 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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adverse ownership interests in the bank's collateral and, therefore, was not
chargeable with notice of an ownership interest disclosed in such a fashion. 266 The court noted that a contrary ruling would undermine substantially the ability of lenders to utilize title searches and to rely on recording
statutes in securing their loans. 267 The court held that although a lender
may be charged with notice of an adverse ownership interest if the facts
and circumstances would put a reasonably prudent lender on notice of
such an interest, 268 the mere possession of a document in which the adverse interest is mentioned does not automatically put the lender on inquiry notice when the circumstances are such that a reasonable lender,
having every incentive to identify any adverse claims that might exist,
would not uncover the information in the course of the transaction. 2 69 The
court further found that the purchaser in Doerge was aware that the seller
was actively constructing the apartment project in accordance with their
contract, and must, or at least should, have been aware that financing for
such construction had been obtained. 270 Given such awareness, the purchaser should have taken steps to determine what financing arrangements
had been made. Because the purchaser did not make such an inquiry and
allowed the lender to continue to fund its loan without objection, the purclaiming that his unrecorded interest was
chaser was estopped from later
27 1
superior to the bank's lien.
In FM. Stigler, Inc. v. H.N C. Really Co. 272 the heirs of an estate sold
certain property, retaining deed of trust and vendor's liens to secure
purchase money financing. The purchase money security instruments provided that the liens could be subordinated to liens securing construction
and improvement financing on the property. The sellers granted an express power of attorney to an agent for the purpose of executing such subordination documents. The agent executed an agreement that purported to
subordinate the vendor's lien and related liens to a loan advanced to
finance the cash portion of the purchase price. Both the sellers' and the
third-party lender's liens went into default, and suit was brought to determine the priority of the liens. The court found that, under the clear and
unambiguous language contained in the written power of attorney, the
agent was only authorized to subordinate the sellers' lien to liens given to
secure construction and improvement financing. 273 The court held that the
subordination agreement executed by the agent in contravention of his authority was, therefore, ineffective to bind the principal. 274 The court also
ruled that the sellers were not estopped from denying the agent's authority
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 807-08.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 807-08.
Id. at 808.

270. Id.

271. Id.
272. 595 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980).
273. Id. at 161.
274. Id. (citing Gouldy v. Metcalf, 75 Tex. 455, 458, 12 S.W. 830, 831 (1889); Reese v.
Medlock, 27 Tex. 120 (1863)).
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due to the agent's acceptance of the benefits of the loan, the cash proceeds
of the sale, because under the sales contract the sellers were entitled 27to5
receive such funds without regard to the purchaser's source of funds.
The supreme court reversed the finding of the court of civil appeals on the
ground that although the sellers were unaware of the unauthorized actions
of their agent at the time of receipt of the cash payment, their failure to
repudiate the subordination and refund the money upon learning the facts
constituted a ratification of the unauthorized act. 276 Thus, the supreme
court refused to allow the sellers to retain the benefits of their agent's unauthorized action without accepting the adverse consequences of that action. While such a policy may generally be sound, in this particular
situation it produced the curious result that the lender, who was aware that
the agent was not authorized to subordinate the vendor's lien, advanced
funds on the basis of the unauthorized subordination and obtained a first
lien on the property.
In Spring Woods Bank v. Lanier277 a general partnership between a father and his son owned a tract of land. The father borrowed certain funds
that he purported to secure with a deed of trust on the partnership's assets.
The son did not consent to this deed of trust and thus, under the applicable
statutes, the deed of trust lien did not attach to the partnership's property
when it was filed.2 78 Thereafter, the father and son orally agreed that the
son would purchase the father's interest in the partnership, which he subsequently did. The father's lender contended that it was entitled to a lien
on a one-half undivided interest in the land under the theory that the oral
agreement between the father and son constituted a dissolution of the partnership, that upon dissolution of the partnership each partner immediately
acquired a one-half undivided interest in the assets of the partnership, and
that by application of the doctrine of after-acquired title, 279 the lien of the
deed of trust previously given by the father attached to his one-half interest in the property at the time of dissolution. 280 The court overruled these
arguments, holding that, while the partnership may have been dissolved by
the oral agreement of the partners, the partnership entity remained in
existence and retained legal title to the property until the final termination
of the partnership and the distribution of its assets. 281 The court held that
the termination of the partnership occurred when the son bought his father's partnership interest, which was at all times personal property: therefore, the father never acquired title to an interest in the property in his own
name, and there was nothing to which the deed of trust lien could at275. 595 S.W.2d at 164.
276. Land Title Co. of Dallas, Inc. v. F.M. Stigler, Inc., 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 117, 119 (Dec.

10, 1980).
277. 601 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
278. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132(b), § 25(2)(b) (Vernon 1970).
279. See generally Hemingway, After-Acquired Title in Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 97, 310 (1966).

280. 601 S.W.2d at 435.
281. Id. at 435; see TEX.

REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132(b), § 30 (Vernon 1970) (partnership continues after dissolution until winding up of affairs has been completed).
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282

B. Foreclosure
1. Rights of Mortgagee. In a case of first impression in Texas the court in
Riverside Properties v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of
America 283 held that when the parties to an instrument contractually agree
to the appointment of a receiver of property, 2 84 such a provision gives authority to a court to appoint a receiver although the situation does not fall
within any category of the Texas statute that grants Texas courts the general power of appointment. 285 The Riverside decision indicates that the
familiar provision in deeds of trust allowing the appointment of a receiver
at any time the debtor is in default, without regard to the value of the
security, is potentially enforceable in Texas.
In Lawson v. Gibbs286 a lender obtained an assignment of an existing
promissory note and related liens as security for a loan. In connection
with the transaction, the original note was endorsed to the lender. When
the assigned note went into default, the lender appointed a substitute
trustee and proceeded to foreclose the liens securing payment of the note.
The owner of the land subject to the lien petitioned the court to invalidate
the foreclosure sale. The plaintiff argued that because the assignment of
the note to the bank was for collateral purposes only, the borrower, as
collateral assignor, remained the owner of the note and, thus, the only
party who could properly appoint a substitute trustee and foreclose the
liens. The trial court, relying on Merit Homes, Inc. v. Altex Mortgage
C0.287 and Busbice v. Hunt,288 granted summary judgment for the landowner. 289 The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that Merit and Busbice were distinguishable because in each of those cases the notes were not
endorsed to the lenders, the assignees, who, therefore, were not the hold282. 601 S.W.2d at 435.
283. 590 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
284. The deed of trust in question provided:
That the holder of said Note, in any action to foreclose this Deed of Trust
shall be entitled to the appointment of a receiver of the rents and profits of the
herein described premises as a matter of right and without notice, with power
to collect the rents, issues, and profits of said premises, due and coming due
during the pendency of such foreclosure suit, without regard to the value of
the premises or the solvency of any person or persons liable for the payment of
the indebtedness involved in said suit. The Grantor for itself and any subsequent owner hereby waives any and all defenses to the application for a Receiver as above and hereby specifically consents to such appointment without
notice, but nothing herein contained is to be construed to deprive the holder of
the lien of any other right, remedy, or privilege it may now have under the law
to have a Receiver appointed. The provision for the appointment of a Receiver of the rents and profits and the assignment of such rents and profits is
made an express condition upon which the loan hereby secured is made.
Id. at 737.
285. Id. at 738; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2293 (Vernon 1971).
286. 591 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
287. 402 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, writ ref d n.r.e.).
288. 430 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
289. See 591 S.W.2d at 293.
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ers. 290 The court in Lawson held that when the debtor unconditionally
endorses a note to the lender, the lender became the holder or owner of the
note and is entitled to exercise all incidents of ownership. 29' Noting that
any security given for a debt follows the debt as long as it exists, 292 the
court held that the lender, as assignee, was entitled to exercise the rights of
included the right to appoint
the beneficiary under the deed of trust, which293
lien.
the
foreclose
to
and
trustee
a substitute
2. Good Faith Purchaser. The rights of bona fide purchasers for value in
the context of foreclosure sales were litigated in several cases during the
survey period. In Bracken v. Haid & Kyle, Inc.294 Bracken had contracted
to purchase a home. While Bracken was engaged in a dispute with the
seller over the contract, an existing mortgage on the home went into default, and the mortgagee posted the home for foreclosure and eventually
sold it to a good faith purchaser over Bracken's objections. Bracken sued
to set aside the foreclosure sale on the grounds that, by virtue of his contract to purchase, he was an equitable owner of the property and, therefore, should have been allowed to redeem the home prior to foreclosure.
The court held that Bracken was not entitled to have the foreclosure sale
set aside as against a good faith purchaser who had no notice of his equitable claim. 295 Left unanswered, however, was the question of whether an
equitable owner of property has any redemption rights prior to foreclosure.
The opinion of the court in Henke v. First Southern Properties,Inc.296
points out one risk that good faith purchasers can not effectively protect
against at a foreclosure sale. In Henke the mortgagee accelerated the debt
in question and posted the property for foreclosure after a series of defaults. The mortgagee, however, agreed with the borrower that it would
reinstate the loan if specified conditions were met before foreclosure. The
borrower fully complied with the conditions, and the loan was reinstated.
On the day after the reinstatment the lender assigned the note to a third
party, who proceeded with the foreclosure sale. At the foreclosure sale, the
property was sold to a good faith purchaser who was unaware of the circumstances. The court held that the trustee's sale was invalid and the conveyance was void because the indebtedness secured by the mortgage was
not in default at the time of the foreclosure. 297 The court further held that
the good faith purchaser doctrine is applicable only where the purchaser
buys from a holder of legal title to property who has the power to convey,
290. Id. at 294.
291. Id.
292. Id. (citing Nutt v. Anderson, 87 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935, writ
dism'd)).
293. 591 S.W.2d at 294.
294. 589 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
295. Id. at 502 (citing Connor v. Lane, 355 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962, no
writ)).
296. 586 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
297. Id. at 620.
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and because the note was not in default, the trustee was without power to
convey the property. 298
3. ForeclosureProcedures. In Hausmann v. Texas Savings & Loan Association299 the court was given the opportunity to clarify the statutory requirement 3°° that notice be given to the debtor prior to foreclosure of a
deed
of trust lien. The plaintiffs had purchased certain property "subject
to" 30 1 existing indebtedness, which indebtedness subsequently went into
default, and the lender foreclosed the property. The plaintiffs sought to set
aside the foreclosure sale by reason of the lender's alleged failure to give
them the statutory notice. The court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to statutory notice because they acquired the property subject to the
indebtedness, with no personal liability therefor, and, thus, were not "debtors" entitled to notice under the statute. 30 2 The court further ruled that
even if the plaintiffs were entitled to notice, the lender had complied with
the statute when it sent notice to them at their residence address. 30 3 The
court ruled that this notice provided the minimal level of protection intended by the statute, even though the residence address was one of three
separate addresses, the other two being post office boxes, which had been
used from time to time by the lender, and may not have been the most
recent address known to the lender. 3°4 The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that as husband and wife they were entitled to separate notices
under the statute, ruling that a joint notice sent30to5 both husband and wife
is sufficient, at least when they reside together.
Further clarification of the notice requirements was provided in Lido
InternationalInc. v. Lambeth ,306 where the deed of trust specified a place
for all notices to be given. The borrower temporarily returned to his native Iran and so notified the lender, but did not specifically request a
change in the place for notice as stated in the deed of trust. In his absence,
the lender complied with the deed of trust provisions and foreclosed the
property. The court held that a mere change in the actual address of the
to override the
borrower, even if known by the lender, is not sufficient
30 7
contractual notice provisions of the deed of trust.
298. Id. at 621 (citing Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S.W. 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1919, writ refd)).
299. 585 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
300. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
301. More precisely, the Hausmanns' interest in the property was subordinate to the lien
in question, and, thus, they could lose the property if they failed to pay the debt, but they
had no direct liability to the lender for payment of the debt and the lender's only recourse

against them was to foreclose upon their property.
302. 585 S.W.2d at 800.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id.
Id.
Id.
601 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980). [Editor's Note: After this Article

went to print, the supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals and remanded the case to
the trial court. 611 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1981). This decision will be discussed in next year's

Survey.]

307. 601 S.W.2d at 115.
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In Dodson v. McCoy 30 8 a foreclosure sale was carried out in the corner
of the Harris County courthouse lobby. While there were a large number
of people physically present, which qualified the sale as a "public" sale, the
evidence showed that the trustee merely held up some papers, mumbled
something that was inaudible to the people in the immediate vicinity, sold
a house valued at $70,000 for just over $11,000, and then turned and
walked away. 30 9 Under these circumstances, the court ruled that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the trustee failed to act
fairly and impartially and that this failure was the direct cause of the
grossly inadequate consideration received at the sale. 3 10 Therefore, the
3
court set the foreclosure sale aside. i
In Burnell v. Manufacturer'sHanover Trust Co. 31 2 the court held that a
foreclosure sale carried out by a substitute trustee acting without a valid
appointment constitutes grounds for an action in damages against the
trustee. 31 3 In Burnett the trustee foreclosed the property based upon a
written request to do so by the servicing agent on the loan. This written
request did not constitute a "writing signed by the holder" of the debt,
which, under the terms of the deed of trust, was required for appointment
of a substitute trustee. 314 In so holding, the court distinguished a wrongful
foreclosure, te., an unauthorized sale of the mortagagor's3 5property, from a
mere irregular exercise of a matured right to foreclose. 1
In Valley InternationalProperties, Inc. v. Ray 3 16 the plaintiff sought
damages against the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty and attempted to
have a foreclosure sale set aside. The property in question was posted for
foreclosure with the normal statement that the sale would be for "cash."
The mortgagee, however, worked out an arrangement with a bidder so that
the lender would loan him funds to purchase the property at foreclosure.
At the foreclosure sale, the bidder was allowed to credit the amount of his
loan against the purchase price. The court found this practice unobjectionable, notwithstanding the "cash" requirement set forth in the trustee's notice, because it would have been a useless exercise for the lender to lend
funds to the bidder, who would pay the funds over to the trustee to be
returned to the lender. 31 7 The court noted that the procedure in question
caused no harm to the mortgagor and was thus not a ground to set aside
the foreclosure sale. 31 8 The plaintiffs claim against the trustee for breach
of fiduciary duty was based upon the fact that the trustee assisted the ultimate purchaser in preparing a "bid sheet" on the property and rendered
308. 601 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).

309. Id.at 131.
310. Id.
311. Id.at 132.
312. 593 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).

313.

Id. at 757.

314. Id.
315. Id.at 758.
316. 586 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).

317. Id. at 901.
318. Id.
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other services in connection with its preparation for sale, for which services
the trustee was paid a $10,000 fee. The court also found these activities
have been entitled to bid at the
unobjectionable, in that the trustee 31would
9
foreclosure sale on his own behalf.
In Slaughter Investment Co. v. Cooper 320 the court refused to enjoin a
foreclosure sale by the holder of a junior lien note when the only default
was a failure by the borrower to comply with its contractual obligation to
provide the lender with notice that payment had been made on the superior notes and with copies of its payment checks. 32 ' No mention was made
whether the superior notes actually were in default; rather, the acceleration
and foreclosure were based solely on the borrower's failure to comply with
its nonmonetary obligation to provide notice of payment.
4. Pre-Bankruptcy Foreclosure. In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co .322 the Fifth Circuit held that a pre-bankruptcy foreclosure under
a deed of trust was a voidable fraudulent conveyance under section 67(d)
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, 323 because the purchaser at
foreclosure did not pay a "fair equivalent" for the real property. 324 The
trustee under the deed of trust sold the mortgaged property for approximately fifty-five percent of the value of the property. 325 Overruling the
mortgagee's and the purchaser's contentions that the foreclosure of property was not a "transfer" under the Act, the court stated that the retention
of possession of the property by the debtor until foreclosure kept the transfer by deed of trust from becoming final until the date of foreclosure. 326 In
a dictum the court seemed to indicate that a transfer of real property for
less than seventy percent of its market value will not be considered a transimmune from a fraudulent conveyance challenge
fer for fair equivalent
327
under the Act.
319. Id. at 901-02; see Tarrant Savings Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 476

(Tex. 1965); Fuqua v. Burrell, 474 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ refd
n.r.e.).

320. 597 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
321. Id. at 458.
322. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
323. 11 U.S.C. § 107(D) (1976) (repealed 1978). The sale of the property under attack
occurred Jan. 4, 1977.
324. The Bankruptcy Act provided:
(1) For the purposes of. . . this subdivision. . . consideration given for the

property or obligation of a debtor is "fair" (1) when, in good faith, in
exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor. ...
(2) Every transfer made and every obligation by a debtor within one year
prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title by
or against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time of such
transfer or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration . ..
11 U.S.C. § 107(D) (1976) (repealed 1978).

325. The bankruptcy court had determined that the property had a value of $200,000.
The purchaser at foreclosure had bid in the amount of $115,000. No party challenged the
valuation of the property on appeal. 621 F.2d at 203.
326. Id. at 204.
327. Id. at 203.
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5. Due-on-Sale Clause. Sonny Arnold Inc. v. Sentry Savings Association328 may ultimately prove to be one of the most important Texas real
estate cases in recent years. That case presents a challenge to the enforceability of the so-called "due-on-sale" clause, 329 which allows the mortgagee to accelerate the secured indebtedness if the property is sold during the
term of the mortgage. In Sonny Arnold the mortgagee approved a sale of
the mortgaged property to a corporation, but such approval was contingent
upon an increase in the interest rate on the mortgage. The property was
then sold to a limited partnership and an individual, without an increase in
the interest rate. The purchaser and seller argued that because the conveyance documents provided that the seller remained liable for the payment
of the debt, the terms of the deed of trust were complied with and the
lender was not entitled to accelerate as a result of the sale. In the reported
opinion, the court of civil appeals merely upheld the issuance of an order
restraining the foreclosure sale and remanded the case for a trial on the
merits. 330 The ultimate decision in this case by the supreme court, however, may settle the issue of whether, or to what extent, the due-on-sale
33 1
clause is enforceable in Texas.
C.

Usury

1. Interest. During the survey period courts were faced with several cases
that raised questions as to whether certain fees and charges constituted
interest for purposes of the usury statutes. In Texas interest is defined as
lawful compensation for the "use or forbearance or detention of
money. ' 332 In Stedman v. Georgetown Savings & Loan Association333 the
plaintiff arranged a loan commitment and was charged ten percent per
annum on the full committed sum during the period that the commitment
was outstanding. The parties referred to this charge as interest, the holder
of the commitment was billed by the lender for interest on a monthly basis,
328. 602 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).

329. The clause in question provided:
19.

TRANSFERS OF THE PROPERTY OR BENEFICIAL INTER-

ESTS IN BORROWER; ASSUMPTION: On sale or transfer of (i) all or any
part of the Property, or any interest therein, or (ii) beneficial interests in Borrower (if Borrower is not a natural person but is a corporation, partnership,
trust or other legal entity) Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all of the
sums secured by this Instrument to be immediately due and payable, and
lender may invoke any remedies permitted by paragraph 27 of this Instrument. This option shall not apply in case of. . .(b) sales or transfers when
the transferee's credit worthiness and management ability are satisfactory to
Lender and the transferee has executed, prior to the sale or transfer, a written
assumption agreement containing such terms as Lender may require, includ-

ing, if required by Lender, an increase in the rate of interest payable under the
Note.
Id. at 92.
330. Id. at 93.
331. See generally Report of Subcommittee on "Due-On" Clauses of the A.B.A. Committee on Real Estate Financing, Enforcement of Due-on-Transfer Clauses, 13 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 891 (1978).
332. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971).

333. 595 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1979).
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and the lender admitted at trial that it considered the charge to be interest.
The supreme court, however, affirmed the decision of the court of civil
appeals 334 and ruled that regardless of the labels applied to the charge by
the parties, the amount was in fact a bona fide commitment fee and did not
constitute a charge for the use, forbearance, or detention of money. 335 Because no funds were advanced during the commitment period and because
the borrower was not obligated to borrow the funds available under the
commitment, the court held that the charge was merely an option price to
be paid by the prospective borrower to assure that the funds would be
available when needed. 336 A minority of the court would have held the fee
to be interest rather than a bona fide commitment fee 337 because the
charge was not reasonable, the lender made judicial admissions that the
fee was charged as interest, and the majority's holding creates a loophole
through which lenders may extract additional compensation for the use of
338
their funds.
In Rinyu v. Teal 33 9 the plaintiffs sold a tract of land in order to raise
money and acquired a term lease of the property as well as an oral repurchase option at a premium price. In a suit to recover the property, the
plaintiffs argued that the arrangement was in fact a mortgage on which
usurious interest was charged. 340 The court found, however, that the
transaction involved was merely an option to repurchase and that there
was no absolute obligation to repay the funds advanced. 34' Therefore, the
court held that no loan existed from which usurious interest penalties
342
could arise.
334. 575 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978). For a more detailed discussions of this case in the lower courts, see Raines, supra note 1, at 83.
335. 595 S.W.2d at 490. See also Delta Enterprises v. Gage, 555 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (substance rather than labelling determines
whether payments constitute interest).
336. 595 S.W.2d at 489. The court stated that in the case of a bona fide commitment fee,
"the borrower has bought the right to secure a loan if he later decides he wants it." Id.
337. Id. at 490-502. For a discussion on bona fide commitment fees, see Gonzales
County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976).
338. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice Pope questioned the majority's
recharacterization of charges that the parties considered interest, and that began to accrue
from the moment the potential loan funds were reserved, quoting the following language:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's
all."

"Alice was too much puzzled to say anything."
595 S.W.2d at 502.
339. 593 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
340. If the transaction had been considered a loan, the repurchase premium would have
been more than twice the then allowable interest rate. Id. at 761; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971).
341. 593 S.W.2d at 761-62.
342. Id. at 761. The court recognized that under some circumstances a sale with a repurchase option could be viewed as a mortgage, especially when an unrealistic price renders
exercise of the repurchase option almost mandatory in light of the actual market value of the
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2. Time-Price Dfferential. The time-price differential exception to the
definition of interest contained in the usury statute 343 was illustrated in
Mid States Homes, Inc. v. Sullivan .344 In Mid States the parties entered
into a contract for deed for the sale of a home. The contract stated the
consideration, including the cash price, the cash downpayment, the
amount financed, the finance charge, the total payments, and the annual
percentage rate. The purchaser alleged that the 11.4% finance charge was
usurious. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument, the court agreed with the
defendant that the arrangement in question was a bona fide time-price differential. 345 The court noted that when a contract on its face provides both
a cash price and a deferred payment price, and these figures are revealed
to the purchaser at the time of the execution of the contract, the amount of
the finance charge will not be deemed interest, but rather a time-price differential paid by the purchaser for the privilege of paying for the property
346
in installments over time.
3. Lease Agreements. In Apparel Manufacturing Co. v. Vantage Properties, Inc. 347 a lease agreement provided that "[iun the event any rental is
not received within 10 days after its due date for any reason whatsoever, it
is agreed that the amount thus due shall bear interest at the maximum
contractual rate. . .(but in no event to exceed 11/2%per month) .... ,,348
The lease specified that any such increase would be payable as additional
rent. The tenant was late in making payments, and the landlord demanded a "late charge" at the one-and-one-half percent per month maximum stated rate, even though the maximum lawful interest rate on the
amount in question under Texas usury law would have been ten percent
per annum. 349 The court found that the parties had contracted for additional rent in the event of late payment and that the transaction did not fall
within the purview of the definition of "lenders" or "loans" under the
usury statutes. 350 The court concluded that the use of the word interest
was merely incidental to the late charge provisions, even though the charge
may have exceeded the amount that could have been charged as interest
on a loan of similar size. 35 1 This case is consistent with recent Texas cases
holding that the usury statutes do not apply to rental transactions of real
property. Id. at 762. The court stated that the question is one of the intentions of the parties
as shown by the contract or the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 76 1. See also Poole, Real
Estate Sale-Leaseback Agreements Under Texas Usury Law. Circumvention or Sale?, 7 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 821, 833 (1976).
343. The statute provides: "'Interest' is the compensation allowed by law for the use or
forbearance or detention of money; provided, however, this term shall not include any time
price differential however denominated arising out of a credit sale." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971).
344. 592 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
345. Id. at 30.
346. Id. at 31.
347. 597 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
348. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
349. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971)).
350. 597 S.W.2d at 448-49.
351. 1d. at 449.
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property.

352

353
4. Choice of Law. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram,
a case that involved a sale-leaseback of farm equipment rather than real
estate, has probably caused as much discussion and concern among real
estate practitioners as any case reported during the survey period. In
Woods-Tucker the Fifth Circuit, exercising its diversity jurisdiction, held
that Texas choice of law rules applied to a loan by an out-of-state lender
made to a Texas borrower, notwithstanding the fact that the contract documents expressly provided that the transaction was to be governed by the

law of the State of Mississippi. 354 The court determined that Texas choice

of law rules would be applied by a Texas court so as to protect Texas
borrowers. 355 The holding in Woods-Tucker appears to be contrary to a
long line of Texas case law to the effect that when the parties contractually
agree to apply the law of a particular state to their transaction, their agreement will be enforced if the chosen state has some reasonable contact with
the parties and the transaction in question. 356 Petition for rehearing has
been filed, 357 and several amicus curiae briefs have been filed requesting
that the court reverse its decision, not only because a federal court sitting
in diversity should apply the existing law of the forum state, 35 8 but also
because of the adverse economic impact that may result if out-of-state
352. See, e.g., Maloney v. Andrews, 483 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
353. 626 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1980). [Editor's Note: After this Article went to print, the
Fifth Circuit, on rehearing, withdrew its earlier opinion, and substituted in its place an opinion that affirmed the district court in its honoring of the parties' contractual choice of law.
No. 79-1651, slip op. at 5536 (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 1981). This decision will be discussed in next
year's Survey.]
354. 626 F.2d at 410.
355. Id. at 408.
356. See Dugan v. Lewis, 79 Tex. 246, 14 S.W. 1024 (1891) (the parties have a right to
enforce their own wishes with respect to a contract providing for their intended choice of
law, forum not being the controlling factor); Hi Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing Trust v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 579 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ) (governing law
provision will be given effect so long as free from taint and the chosen state bears a reasonable relation to the parties and transactions); Securities Inv. Co. v. Finance Acceptance
Corp., 474 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 197 1, writ refd n.r.e.) (choice of
law provision will be given effect if the chosen state has a reasonable relationship with the
contract).
Moreover, although not cited in Woods-Tucker, the Texas Business and Commerce Code
provides:
(a) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties
may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall
govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this title applies to
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
(b) Where one of the following provisions of this title specifies the applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to
the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) so specified:
Rights of creditors against sold goods.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
357. See note 353 supra.
358. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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lenders are unable to lend funds to Texas borrowers at interest rates competitive with those available in other states. Given the large numbers of
loans to Texas borrowers providing that the agreements are to be governed
by the law of other states, generally states that have higher usury ceilings
than Texas, this case could have dramatic consequences.
5. Legislation. Because the Texas Legislature was not in session during
the survey period, the only statutory changes in the usury area arose under
federal law. A complete discussion of federal legislation is beyond the
scope of this Article, but recent federal preemption statutes directly affect
formerly applicable Texas usury limitations. As discussed in last year's
Survey article, 359 Congress passed Public Law 96-161,360 which became

effective on December 28, 1979. This legislation made significant changes
with respect to federal preemption of state usury ceilings. 36 1 The Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980362 and the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1980363 continue and expand federal preemption by allowing more lenders to charge higher interest rates. 364 This
recent federal legislation should be consulted in determining the extent to
which Texas usury laws remain applicable to any given transaction.
IV.

MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

A. Attachment andPerfection of Liens
3 65 dealt with a priority
1. Attachment. The court in Inman v. Orndorff
dispute between a mechanic's lienholder, who began work on improvements located on a tract of land at the request of a party not in title, and
the holder of a vendor's lien covering the land at the time work commenced. The court found that a mechanic's lien attaches to the interest of
the person contracting for construction and, because the person contracting with the instant mechanic had no legal or equitable interest in the
property at the time of contracting, the court ruled that the mechanic's lien
366
did not attach until the purchaser acquired an interest in the property.
Thus, the court held that the holder of the vendor's lien had priority over

359. Raines, supra note 1, at 89.
360. Act of Dec. 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-161, §§ 101-212, 93 Stat. 1233 (1979).

361. Id. § 105 lifted all state usury ceilings on residential mortgage loans made by federally related lenders. Title II of the legislation allowed various federally related lenders to
charge interest at a rate up to five percent over the federal discount rate on business and
agricultural loans greater in amount than $25,000. 93 Stat. at 1235.
362. Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 101-902, 94 Stat. 132-93 (1980).
363. Pub. L. No. 96-399, § 324, 94 Stat. 1614 (1980).
364. A complete discussion of the intricacies of these two Acts is beyond the scope of this
Article. After the latest amendment, however, among numerous changes, the raising of
usury ceilings applies to individuals who finance the sale or exchange of their homes, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, § 501(a)(l), 94 Stat. 161 (1980), and the threshold limit for business and agricultural loans has been lowered from $25,000 to $1,000. Pub. L. No. 96-399, § 324(d), 94 Stat.
1648 (1980).

365. 596 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
366. Id. at 238.
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367
the mechanic's lien claimant.

2. Perfection. In Lopez v. Bonded Construction & Supply Co. 368 the court

reiterated the settled rule that when a subcontractor fails to perfect his
mechanic's lien he is not entitled to a money judgment against the owner
in the absence of privity of contract or other circumstances that would
render the owner personally liable. 369 In Lopez the subcontractor timely

filed a statutory mechanic's lien affidavit 370 claiming its lien against the
owner's property and mailed two copies of the affidavit by certified mail to
the owner. The subcontractor, however, failed to furnish the owners with
written notice as required by section (2)(b) of article 5453.371 The court

found that the giving of such notice to the owners is a condition precedent
owner's auto the creation of a subcontractor's lien and the concommitant
372
contractor.
original
the
to
owed
funds
withhold
thority to
B.

Whirlpool Doctrine

Two cases during the survey period dealt with the rule established by
the Texas Supreme Court in First National Bank v. Whirlpool, 3 7 3 which
provides that a materialman's lien is superior to the lien of a prior deed of
trust to the extent of improvements supplied by the lien claimant that have
not yet been incorporated into the structure or, if previously incorporated,
can be removed without injury to the remaining structure. 374 In such instance the lien claimant bears the burden of identifying and segregating
the materials supplied by him to which his lien may attach. 375 In Richard
H Sikes, Inc. v. L&N Consultants, Inc. 376 the lienholder defended against
a materialman's claim on the ground that the general contractor's lien did
not attach to removables placed in the property by subcontractors and that
the contractor should not be able to foreclose its lien against the removables because it had not paid the subcontractors in question. The court
noted that although foreclosure of a senior deed of trust lien extinguishes a
junior mechanic's lien on land and improvements, a perfected mechanic's
and materialman's lien extends to all improvements supplied by the claimant that can be removed without material injury to the land regardless of
367. Id. But see Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractor, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1974), discussed in Raines, supra note 1, at 93-96 (supreme

court permitted a mechanic's lien to attach to a contract interest).
368. 594 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
369. Id. at 813; see, e.g., Herrington v. Luce, 491 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1973, no writ).
370. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). A subcontractor who may be entitled to a lien must file with the county clerk an affidavit claiming his
lien within 90 days after the alleged indebtedness accrues. Id. For a definition of the accrual of indebtedness, see id. art. 5467.
371. Id. art. 5453(2)(b)(1).
372. 594 S.W.2d at 812.
373. 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974).
374. Id. at 269; see Raines, supra note 1, at 97.
375. Kaspar v. Cockrell-Riggins Lighting Co., 511 S.W.2d 109, 110-11 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1974, no writ).
376. 586 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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where the improvements are placed in the property. 3 77 The court further
found that a general contractor actually furnishes labor and materials
through its subcontractors under its general contract with the owner and,
thus, the general contractor's lien attaches to such improvements regardless of whether the subcontractors had been paid, and the general contractor is thus entitled to foreclose its lien. 378 The court reasoned that allowing
the general contractor's lien to extend to all improvements including
removables furnished by his unpaid subcontractors did not expose the
owner9 or a successor in interest to an unwarranted risk of double liability.

37

The court in Monocrete Pty. Ltd v. Exchange Savings & Loan Associa-

lion 380 considered the proper standard to be used in determining whether

improvements can be removed without material injury to the existing improvements or to the materials themselves. The court held that one standard for defining material injury is based on the economic benefit to be
realized by the materialman. 38 l The evidence presented showed that concrete roofing tiles could be removed from three houses in question, and
that, allowing for breakage, there was economic benefit to be gained by the
materialmen by removing the tiles. 382 The court noted that the requirement of economic benefit would prevent spiteful removal by materialmen.3 83 The court found that no evidence was presented to show that
material injury to preexisting improvements would occur as a result of the
removal process and that the fact that the remaining structure would be
after the roof had been removed was
subject to damage from the elements
384
not relevant to the decision.
377. Id. at 955-56.
378. Id. at 956.
379. Id. The court stated that in the event of a suit by a subcontractor with a perfected
lien against the owner, the contractor must defend the suit at his own expense. Id. (citing
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5463(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981)). Moreover, this article
Ta ecifcally protects an owner from double liability. 586 S.W.2d at 956. See also In re
amail, 609 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1980) (materialman must be able to identify with specificity
the materials he has furnished before foreclosing lien); Wilson v. Hinton, 131 Tex. 593, 116
S.W.2d 365 (1938) (lien may be created in favor of party who supplies materials through an
agent); Wallace Gin Co. v. Burton-Lingo Co., 104 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1937, no writ) (when materials can be removed without damage to them or to the improvements, fact that lienholder did not furnish all materials is immaterial).
380. 601 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).

381. Id. at 453.
382. The court conceded that less care might be undertaken by one who had estimated a

loss in his quote than would be undertaken by one whose purpose for removal was for
resale. Id. The court, however, found that the evidence in the case before it established that
the tiles would have a substantial economic value, even if a portion of them were damaged

by removal. Id.
383. Id. at 452-53. The court stated that it understood the rationale of the Whirlpool rule
to be to prohibit spiteful removal when a materialman would remove his materials with no

benefit to himself, only to prevent the owner or lienholder from benefiting from his loss. Id.
384. Id.
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C. Extent ofLien with Respect to Multiple OriginalContracts
In McKalp v. Smith Building & Masonry Supply, Inc. 385 the court considered the interaction of articles 5463386 and 5469,387 and the meaning of
the term "contract price" in article 5452.388 Article 5469 requires the owner to retain ten percent of the original contract price for the entire project
during the progress of the work and until thirty days following final completion. 389 Article 5463 provides that when his claim is reduced to judgment a subcontractor's lien may ony attach to the ten percent of the
contract price required to be retained plus any additional amount paid out
by the owner after receipt of statutory notice. 390 Based on these statutes,
the court found that because the owner in this case was required only to
retain ten percent of the original contract under which the lien claimant
had furnished materials and because the owner had paid out additional
amounts prior to receipt of notice from the subcontractor, the lien was
limited to ten percent of the amount of such contract. 39' With respect to
the amount of the contract price the owner was required to retain, the
court noted that in 1973 the Texas Legislature amended article 5452 to
provide for definitions of "contract price" and "work. ' 392 The court held
that these amendments were intended to and do have the effect of limiting
the retainage fund of article 5469 to ten percent of a particular original
contract in situations in which multiple original contracts are executed for
construction of a single project.393 Thus, the court concluded that disbursements to other contractors for unrelated tasks that were completed
and paid for before the plaintiff began performing his contract were not
includable in the
contract price upon which the proper retainage percent394
age was based.
V.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

A. Rents and Their Payment
1. Landlord's Seizure of Property on Leased Premises. McVea v.
Verkins 395 involved the issue of a landlord's liability for conversion of his
tenant's property after the exercise of self-help measures to recover the
leased premises. The lease in question obligated the tenant promptly to
pay annual rents in advance and to use the premises only for grazing livestock. Upon the failure of the tenant to make an annual rent payment and
385. 599 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
386. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5463 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) (owner authorized
to retain funds).

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id. art. 5469 (lien claimant's fund).
Id. art. 5452 (liens prescribed).
Id. art. 5469.
Id. art. 5463.
599 S.W.2d at 887.
Id. at 886-89.

393. Id. at 889.

394. Id.
395. 587 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

after being notified that the tenant had cut a quantity of timber on the
property, the landlord caused the locks on the pasture gate to be changed
and ordered the tenant not to go onto the property. The tenant sued for
conversion of his cattle that had been grazing on the premises at the time
of the lock change. The court observed that, as a general rule, a landlord
cannot terminate a written lease for the tenant's breach of a covenant
without first making demand on the tenant for performance, unless the
lease expressly waives such demand. 396 Because this lease contained no
such waiver, the court ruled that the landlord was required to make demand before exercising the right of reentry set forth in the lease. 397 Furthermore, the court observed that any provision in a lease giving the
landlord a contractual lien upon the personal property of the tenant located on the leased premises does not, standing alone, authorize the landlord to enter and take possession; rather, the landlord must foreclose the
that the
lien by a judicial proceeding. 39 8 The court, therefore, concluded
399
landlord's actions constituted a conversion as a matter of law.
2. Calculation of Gross Rental. In Cocke v. Pacific Gulf Development
Corp .40 the court was asked to construe what constituted total gross room
revenues of a motel on which the landlord's percentage rental was contractually based. The original tenant and the subsequent subtenant had been
deducting credit card discounts and rents from color televisions that the
original tenant had purchased and installed in the rooms.40 1 In response
to the landlord's suit for a declaratory judgment, 40 2 the court upheld the
trial court's findings that the parties intended to include only actual re396. Id. at 531.
397. Id. at 532.
398. Id. at 531. The lease provided: "Lessor shall have a landlord's lien upon all personal property of lessor [sic] placed upon such premises to secure lessee's performance." Id.
at 529. The court observed that the trial occurred with all the litigants assuming that the
lease provided for a landlord's lien on all of the personal property of the lessee contained on
the leased premises. Id. at 532. The court declined to address the fact that the lease actually, if mistakenly, provided for a landlord's lien on all of the landlord's personal property,
finding it unnecessary to the disposition of the appeal. Id.
399. Id. at 534-35. Despite notice of the cutting of timber, the court determined that no
such emergency existed that would necessitate self-help. Id. at 533-34.
400. 594 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
401. Id. at 547. Originally the motel had been constructed without television sets. The
owner was approached by the original tenant with a proposal to participate in adding blackand-white sets to the rooms. The owner agreed, and the cost of the owner's investment was
used in determining the minimum base rental. Subsequently, the original tenant approached the owner with a proposal that color sets be installed in the rooms, but the owner
declined the proposal. Color sets were installed by the original tenant, which did not indicate in its rental reports to the owner color television "rentals" and credit card discounts.
The property was subleased to Howard Johnson, which began reporting the deductions to
the owner. Upon instruction from the owner, Howard Johnson began paying to the owner
the television rentals and the credit card discounts as part of the gross room rental percentage. Id.
402. The owner filed suit for a judgment declaring that the television rentals and credit
card discounts were properly includable in the gross room rental figure. The original tenant
crossclaimed for a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to those income amounts, and
upon a theory of unjust enrichment to the owner because of Howard Johnson's direct payment to the owner of the amounts in question. Id.
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ceipts from room sales and that it was proper, under generally accepted
accounting principles, to include in gross room revenues only that portion
40 3
of credit card invoices actually remitted by the credit card companies.
By contrast, however, the court held that the tenant was not entitled to
withhold from the amount of gross rental rental fees attributable to the
rental fee for the televitenant's color televisions as there was no separate
4 °4
sions in amounts charged to hotel guests.
B.

Security Deposits

Sovereign Management Corp. v. Stanford40 5 involved an appeal by the
landlord from the tenant's suit to recover his security deposit. Article
5236e4 6 permits a landlord to require advance notice of a tenant's intention to vacate the leased premises as a condition to the refund of the tenant's security deposit, provided that such requirement is underlined, or
printed in conspicuous, bold print in the lease. 40 7 The court held that the
underlined provision of the lease in question, which required thirty days'
advance notice of surrender of the leased premises as a condition to refund
of the security deposit, did not constitute an unenforceable penalty
clause. 4° 8 Because the tenant had failed to furnish advance notice of vacation in accordance with the valid provisions of the lease, the court reversed
the original judgment and entered a take-nothing judgment against the
tenant. 40 9 Johnson v. Huie Properties41 0 involved the adequacy of the tenant's notice under section 6(a) of article 5236e, 41 1 which requires that the
tenant furnish the landlord with a written copy of his forwarding address
for purposes of a refund of the security deposit. 41 2 In Johnson the owner
of an apartment building sold the property and informed the tenants that
they would be required to pay their rents to the new owner, and could look
to the new owner for their security deposits. In such a sale the original
owner remains liable for security deposits until the new owner delivers a
signed statement acknowledging receipt of, as well as responsibility for, the
security deposits. 41 3 The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the
owner had failed to comply with the notice requirements of section 5(b) of
article 5236e 41 4 and was therefore not shielded from liability for the deposit. 4 15 On motion for rehearing, however, the court concluded that although a tenant can furnish notice through his attorney, and the use of the
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

Id. at 549.
Id. at 549-50.
594 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
Id.
594 S.W.2d at 555.
Id.
594 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
Id.
Id. § 5(b).
Id.
594 S.W.2d at 490.
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attorney's address is sufficient for purposes of a refund, 41 6 the demand letadter from the tenant's attorney, which disclosed neither the attorney's
41 7
dress nor the tenant's new address, was not adequate compliance.
C. Tenant's Delivery of Premises on Termination of Lease
In Siegler v. Robinson 4 18 the tenant previously had been in default under
a lease for numerous reasons including unauthorized subletting as well as
failure to pay rent, insurance, and taxes, and to maintain the premises.
The landlord had brought suit to regain possession, and, pursuant to an
agreed judgment, the leased premises were returned to the landlord and
the lease was terminated. Subsequently, the landlord brought suit to collect past due rentals, taxes, and insurance premiums, as well as damages
for failure to maintain the leased premises. The court of civil appeals affirmed an instructed verdict in favor of the landlord. 41 9 With respect to the
appropriate measure of damages to the premises, the court distinguished
between a landlord's suit for injury to the premises prior to the expiration
of the lease term, in which damages are to be measured by injury to the
market value of the reversion, 420 and a suit instituted after expiration of
the lease term, in which damages are to be measured by the reasonable
cost of repair. 42 1 Noting that the landlord had validly terminated the lease
for the tenant's breach of covenants and had secured an agreed judgment
to that effect, the court held that such termination should be treated for
that the reasonable cost of
these purposes as an expiration of the lease, and
4 22
repairs was the proper measure of damages.
D. Right of First Re/usal to Purchase Leased Premises
Moore v. Dodge4 23 involved a suit by a tenant against his landlord and
the purchaser of the leased premises based on the tenant's alleged right of
first refusal to purchase the property. The court held that, under general
rules of contract construction, the provision setting forth the right of first
refusal 424 was an enforceable preference right of the tenant to purchase the
within a reasonable time after
premises at the price offered by the lessor,
4 25
notice of the opportunity to purchase.
416. See Tammen v. Page, 584 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ refd
n.r.e.). In Tammen the court held that a tenant can furnish the required written notice
through an agent or attorney and the agent's or attorney's address can serve as the tenant's
forwarding address for the purpose of art. 5236e. Id. at 917.
417. 594 S.W.2d at 491-92.
418. 600 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
419. Id. at 386.
420. Id. at 385 (citing Fagan v. Whitcomb, 14 S.W. 1018, 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1889, no
writ)).
421. 600 S.W.2d at 386 (citing Whitworth Estate v. Mangels of Texas, Inc., 363 S.W.2d
851, 857-58 (Tex. Civ. Ap.-Waco 1962, no writ)).
422. 600 S.W.2d at 3.
423. 603 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
424. The contract provided that the lease was subject to the lessor's right to sell the property, but that the lessor would in such event offer to sell the property to the lessee. Id. at 238.
425. Id. at 239. The court noted that although the purchase price was not specified in the
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In Siegler v. Robinson 426 the court found that the tenant's claim of entitlement to specific performance of his right to purchase the premises set
forth in the lease was groundless. 42 7 The court observed that unless an
option set forth in a lease contains independent consideration for its existence, it does not survive the termination of the lease. 4 28 The court held
lease the tenant lost any preference
that upon lawful termination of the 429
law.
of
matter
a
as
purchase
to
right
E. Landlord's Duty to Repair
In Kaiser v. Northwest Shopping Center, Inc.430 the court concluded that
a tenant's suit for damages for breach of a landlord's obligation to repair
under a commercial lease was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata
even though the tenant had outlined its allegations in its answer 43' in the
landlord's earlier suit for recovery of rental and termination of the lease
for nonpayment. 4 32 The court concluded that, as with a claim for a breach
of a continuing contract, the tenant was not bound to treat the landlord's
breach of its obligation to repair as a total breach of the lease at the time of
the landlord's initial suit, but instead could treat the breach as partial by
continuing to occupy the premises. 433 The court reasoned that the entry of
summary judgment against the tenant was, therefore, inappropriate, as the
tenant was not required in the previous suit to assert, as a counterclaim to
future damages, but merely
the landlord's suit, the tenant's foreseeable
434
those that had accrued to the time of suit.
In Howe v. Kroger Co. 435 a slip-and-fall case, the court held that the
tenant proprietor had no duty to repair or to warn his invitees about dangerous conditions of common areas over which the tenant did not by the
lease retain control. 436 Noting that the occupier of the premises is required
to exercise ordinary care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition so that his invitees will not be injured, the court held that the duty
extends only to the premises and not beyond. 437 The court found that no
purchase option, it could imply that the offer provided in the lease was the intended amount
of the price. Id. The court applied a reasonableness standard for the time in which the offer
was to be accepted or rejected. Id.
426. 600 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For a
discussion of the Siegler case, see notes 418-22 supra and accompanying text.
427. 600 S.W.2d at 385.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. 587 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
431. Id. at 455. The tenant did not raise allegations of the landlord's breached duty in a
counterclaim. Id. at 457. For the purposes of the appeal the court assumed that damages
that had accrued prior to the earlier suit were barred because they should have been asserted
by means of a compulsory counterclaim. Id.
432. Id. at 458. The court held that the record did not conclusively show that the tenant
should have pleaded his continuing damages in the earlier suit. Id.
433. Id. at 457.
434. Id. at 457-58.
435. 598 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
436. Id. at 931.
437. Id.
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issue of fact was raised as to the tenant's alleged breach of duty because
the lease clearly delineated the obligation of the landlord to maintain the
common area on which the accident occurred, and the tenant had no con438
trol over that area.
In Damron v. CR. Anthony Co. 439 the court reaffirmed that a landlord
who undertakes to repair leased premises, whether gratuitously or by contract, has primary liability for discharge of that duty and, therefore, for
any physical harm resulting from the undertaking, even though caused by
the acts of an independent contractor. 440 In Damron the lease provided
that the landlord would maintain exterior parts of the rented building.
Subsequently, the roof began to leak and despite efforts of the landlord's
hired independent contractor to alleviate the condition, some of the plaintiff's personal property received water damage. Notwithstanding language
in the lease permitting the tenant to undertake repairs and deduct the cost
thereof from the rent if the landlord failed to perform repairs, the court of
civil appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that because the landlord
took affirmative action to effectuate the repairs, it was liable for the resulting damage to the tenant's property. 44 1
F. Damagesfor Breach
In Look v. Werlen" 2 the court applied the established measure of damages for anticipatory breach of a lease, which is the difference between the
present value of the contracted rental and the reasonable fair market value
of the lease for the unexpired term.44 3 The premises had been prepared
specially for the tenant's use as a veterinary clinic, and prior to the expiration of the term of the lease the tenant abandoned the premises. Evidence
was presented showing that the landlord made repeated unsuccessful attempts to relet the shopping center space, and due to the unique nature of
the property it was unlikely that the landlord could have secured another
tenant before the expiration of the lease term. Based on these facts the
court of civil appeals affirmed the implied finding of the trial court that the
premises had no market value." 4 Applying the appropriate measure of
damages, the appellate court determined that the landlord was entitled to
the rental contracted for under the lease. 44 5 The court affirmed the award
438. Id.
439. 586 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).

440. Id. at 914.
441. Id. at 914-15; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 419-420 (1965) (lessor personally liable for "physical harm" caused by contractually required or gratuitous repairs
undertaken by independent contractor). But see Hill v. Galveston Hous. Auth., 593 S.W.2d
741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (evidence in suit by tenant to recover

damages to personal property as result of fire to leased premises held insufficient to support
allegation of negligence of landlord in failing to inspect to ascertain dangerous condition).
442. 590 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, no writ).
443. Id. at 527 (citing Thomas v. Morrison, 537 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1976, writ refrd n.r.e.) (grazing and farmland lease); John Church Co. v. Martinez, 204
S.W. 486, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918, writ ref'd) (commercial building lease)).
444. 590 S.W.2d at 527.
445. Id. at 528.

1981]

REAL PROPERTY

of accrued rentals, but modified the landlord's recovery with446respect to
future rentals by discounting such amount to the time of trial.
G.

Termination

In Fidelity Management Co. v. Herod 44 7 the court considered the issue of
whether a tenant had abandoned office premises or whether his landlord
had terminated the lease. The tenant, a dentist, had experienced recurring
difficulties with the building, including flooding of the front office. Exasperated, the tenant eventually withheld a portion of one month's rent attributable to his expenses incurred in repairing a stopped sewer system
after the landlord's agent failed to respond to his complaints. Promptly on
receipt of the reduced rental payment, the landlord sent the tenant notice
to vacate and subsequently filed a forceable entry and detainer action. After judgment that the premises be returned to the landlord, the landlord
filed suit to recover past and future rentals and damages to the premises.
The landlord contended that the tenant's eviction pursuant to the judgment of the justice court constituted an abandonment. In support of its
contention the landlord argued that a letter written to the tenant's attorneys subsequent to judgment in the justice court, indicating that the landlord would not take possession, and setting forth the landlord's efforts to
dismiss the forceable detainer action, demonstrated his intention not to
terminate. The court was not persuaded and held that the lease had been
terminated by the landlord's initial letter.4 8 The court of civil appeals
determined that the tenant's removal in obedience to the justice court's
judgment constituted an acceptance of termination, and affirmed the lower
court's judgment for past due rentals only. 449
JR. Skillern, Inc. v. leVision4 50 involved a suit by the tenant for recovery
of damages for the loss of his leasehold estate as a result of the condemnation of the landlord's building. The lease provided that the landlord, at its
option, could terminate the lease and abate future rentals upon a full or
partial taking of the premises by an authority with the power to do so. The
court observed that in Texas the parties have a right to contract for termination of a lease in the event of condemnation, thereby denying the tenant
446. Id. The court, citing Lee v. Lee, 509 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974,

writ ref'd n.r.e.), noted that the rate of interest established by statute for post-judgment
interest could be used as a discount factor. 590 S.W.2d at 528. The court discounted the
future rentals using the figure of nine percent. See TEX. REV. CIT. STAT. ANN. art. 50691.05 (Vernon 1971)(current version at id. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981)).
447. 600 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
448. Id. at 381-82. The court noted that if the landlord had seriously determined to have
the justice court action dismissed it could have taken a nonsuit. Id. at 382. Instead the
action had proceeded to judgment. Id.; cf. Texaco Inc. v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d
522, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, no writ) (withdrawal of mistakenly delivered cancellation notice and tenant's failure to change position continued effectiveness of
lease).
449. 600 S.W.2d at 382. The lower court's award for damages to the premises was also
affirmed. Id.

450. 591 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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any right to the condemnation proceeds. 45 ' The court disagreed with the
tenant's contention that due to the language in the provision concerning
the landlord's option to terminate the landlord was required to give notice
of intent to terminate. 452 The court concluded that the better rule was to
termination of the lease, withconstrue the provision to result in automatic
4 53
out further action by the landlord.
VI.

PRIVATE RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE

During the survey period, four reported cases involved restrictive covenants in residential subdivisions. In Sugar Creek Homes Association v.
Berry4 54 a representative of the owners of the lots in a subdivision sought a
mandatory injunction to require the defendant homeowner to remove a
portion of a fence erected in violation of the subdivision building restrictions on her lot. The evidence presented to the trial court established that
a representative of the homeowners' association had approved the location
of the fence, knowing that the location violated the set-back line. 45 5 The

court determined that the homeowner had no knowledge of the falsity of
the representation in the approval, that the fence location did not violate
the set-back restriction, that the representation was made with the intention that the homeowner act upon it, and that the homeowner relied upon
the false representation in completing the fence.4 5 6 The court of civil appeals held that the homeowner had established the affirmative defense of
estoppel and that the act of the homeowners' association in sending written
approval constituted a waiver of its rights to enforce the provisions of the
subdivision restrictions. 457 In New JerusalemBaptist Church,Inc. v. City of
Houston4 58 the city brought an action against a church corporation seeking
to enjoin the church from using its property for church purposes or for
commercial activity in violation of the deed restrictions for the subdivision. The church had purchased a lot without notice of outstanding deed
restrictions 459 and had placed a sign on the property informing the public
that the property was to be the future site of a church, but the sign became
illegible and overgrown by weeds. The church was thereafter informed by
451. Id. at 599 (citing Evans Prescription Pharmacy, Inc. v. County of Ector, 535 S.W.2d
704 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd) (lease providing for automatic termination)).
452. 591 S.W.2d at 599.
453. Id. at 600.
454. 590 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
455. A survey of the subdivision had been made at the request of a title company. The
proper set-back line was established by the surveyor after the encroachment occurred. Upon
receiving a complaint from a neighbor about the location of the fence, a representative of the
homeowners' association, for an undisclosed reason, told the surveyor that the association
would hold the surveyor harmless if he would prepare a false survey accommodating the
fence. The adjustment was made. Id. at 592. The designer of the fence, without knowledge
that the survey had been altered, submitted the survey for approval of the fence location.
The association representative thereafter approved the fence location. Id.
456. Id. at 592-93.
457. Id. at 593.
458. 598 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
459. The church denied actual knowledge of the restrictions despite their appearance in
the deed. Id. at 667. Knowledge of the restrictions was not an issue in the case.
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a civic group that its intended use would be in violation of the subdivision's restrictive covenants. Nonetheless, the church proceeded with arrangements for the construction of the church building and moved the
building onto the lot. At trial, the church argued that because of the expenses incurred in the grading of the lot and in the construction and transportation of the building, the city's interest in enforcing the deed
restrictions was outweighed by the hardship that would be experienced by
the church if forced to remove the building. Moreover, the church argued
that because of the length of time before the city took action after the
placement of the sign, and because of other nonconforming uses in the
neighborhood, the city was barred by laches from complaining of the
building's location. The court of civil appeals noted that the equities must
favor a landowner, adversely affected by restrictive covenants, by a consid460
erable magnitude before a court will decline to enforce a restriction.
The court found that in this case the equities did not so favor the
church,46 1 because the lots could be sold in order to acquire funds for acquisition of an alternative site, and because the building placed on the lot
could be readily moved. 462 Placing primary reliance on the inconspicuousness of the sign, the court held that an average man would reasonably
463
conclude that the restrictions had not been abandoned by the city.
In Gilbert v. Shenandoah Valley Improvement Association464 the court
reiterated the rule that a strict construction must be given to restrictive
covenants because all doubt must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the property. 465 The court dissolved an injunction prohibiting the rental of numerous single family homes constructed on
subdivision lots because there was no specific prohibition in the applicable
restrictions.4 66 The court found immaterial the argument that the defendant was operating a rental business. 467 In Wade v. Anderson 468 the plaintiff
sought an order to require the removal of a mobile home from a lot in his
subdivision. A restrictive covenant provided that "all buildings must be
constructed of wood, wood siding, wood shingles, masonry, asbestos shingles or of material of equal or better quality. '469 The court of civil appeals
held that placement of the mobile home on the lot was a violation of the
restrictive covenant because, as the trial court had found, the mobile home
was not constructed of the requisite type or quality of materials. 470 The
460. Id. at 668 (citing Cowling v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458, 312 S.W.2d 943 (1958)).

461. 598 S.W.2d at 668-69.
462. Id. at 668.
463. Id.

464. 592 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
465. Id. at 29 (citing MacDonald v. Painter, 441 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Tex. 1969); Southampton Civic Club v. Couch, 159 Tex. 464, 468, 322 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. 1958); Baker v.
Henderson, 137 Tex. 266, 270, 153 S.W.2d 465, 470 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1941, opinion
adopted)).
466. 592 S.W.2d at 29.
467. Id.
468. 602 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
469. Id. at 348.
470. Id. at 348-49. The mobile home was constructed of aluminum siding. Id. at 348.
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dissent would have strictly construed the restrictions in favor of free and
unrestricted use of the property, because there was no specific prohibition
against the location of mobile homes in the subdivision.4 7' The dissent
noted that the plaintiffs main objection was to the mere presence
of the
472
mobile home rather than to the type or quality of material used.

471. Id. at 349 (Keith, J., dissenting).
472. Id. Expert testimony at trial established that the aluminum siding on the mobile
home was the same type as that covering another house in the subdivision. Id.

